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capture about 80% of U.S. emissions by taxing fewer than 3,000 taxpayers and up 
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delegation of rate setting authority to an agency to ensure that rates reflect new 
information about the costs of carbon emissions and of abatement.  Adjustments 
should be made to the income tax to ensure that a carbon tax is revenue neutral 
and distributionally neutral.  Finally, we propose an origin-based system for trade 
with countries that have an adequate carbon tax and a system of border taxes for 
imports from countries without a carbon tax.  We suggest a system that imposes 
presumptive border tax adjustments with the ability of an individual firm to prove 
that a different rate should apply.  The presumptive tax could be based either on 
average emissions for production of the item by the exporting country or by the 
importing country.   
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This paper considers the design of a tax on greenhouse gases.  The 
purpose of such a tax, which we will generally refer to as a carbon tax, is to 
internalize externalities associated with anthropogenic climate change.1  Without 
a carbon tax, individuals face a distorted set of prices.  Activities that result in 
carbon emissions are relatively too cheap because individuals will not consider 
the costs the emissions impose on others, including on future generations.  A tax 
forces individuals to consider the full set of consequences from emissions.   
The theory behind these sorts of taxes dates back to writings by Pigou, 70 
years ago, but there is little experience with the design of these taxes and almost 
none with a Pigouvian tax that covers a substantial portion of the economy, as 
would a carbon tax.2  There are several existing carbon taxes but all are 
comparatively narrow or are otherwise badly designed.  There have also been 
several proposed carbon taxes introduced into legislation in the U.S., but only in 
bare bones form.  Although we can learn from these examples, they do not serve 
as adequate models for the best possible design of a carbon tax.   
We consider three central design issues: the tax base (including possible 
offsets or credits), the tax rate (including distributional issues, the use of the 
revenues, and tax rate changes), and trade.  With respect to the base, we show that 
by collecting the tax upstream, we can accurately and cheaply cover 80 percent of 
U.S. emissions by taxing fewer than 3,000 taxpayers, and that we can cover close 
                                                 
1 As we will discuss below, there are a wide variety of greenhouse gases other than carbon.  See 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (2007): "Climate Change 2007 -- the Physical 
Science Basis, Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC," 
Cambridge University Press. p. 33 for a list of greenhouse gases.  We refer to the tax generically 
as a carbon tax with the understanding that it will likely cover a wide variety of greenhouse gases.  
We will not discuss the science behind anthropogenic climate change.  See INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (2007): "Climate Change 2007 -- the Physical Science Basis, 
Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC," Cambridge 
University Press. for a review of the science. 
2 PIGOU, A. C. (1938): The Economics of Welfare. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.  For a 
review of the theory behind these taxes, see BOVENBERG, A. L., and L. H. GOULDER (2002): 
"Environmental Taxation and Regulation," Amsterdam, Netherlands: Elsevier Science.  There are 
a number of papers that consider design issues from a general perspective, such as how to set the 
tax when there are administrative costs of collection.  See, for example, POLINSKY, A. M., and S. 
SHAVELL (1982): "Pigouvian Taxation with Administrative Costs," Journal of Public Economics, 
19, 385-394. 
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to 90 percent of U.S. emissions at a modest additional cost.  As the base gets 
broader, the collection costs increase, and the tradeoff between the increased 
collection costs and the benefits of a broader base determine the optimal tax base.   
The main problem presented by upstream collection is that a tax credit or offset 
must be given for fossil fuels that are not combusted.  For example, if a tax is 
imposed at the refinery and some distillates are sequestered into products such as 
asphalt, the tax will be too broad.  We discuss how such a credit system would be 
designed. 
Although the theory behind setting the rate is well known – it should equal 
the marginal harm from emissions – there are a number of difficult design issues.3  
The most difficult issue with respect to rates is the design of a system for ensuring 
that the rate changes over time as we learn new information about the costs and 
benefits of reducing emissions.  In particular, a central problem with climate 
change is uncertainty about the effects and uncertainty about the costs of 
abatement.  The best that can be done now is a crude estimate of the optimal rate.  
As we learn new information, the tax rate will have to change to reflect this.  We 
suggest a delegation or partial delegation of rate setting authority to an expert 
agency to ensure that rate changes at appropriate intervals are on the agenda and 
expertise in the relevant parameters for setting the rate.  Given the size of the tax 
and the potential winners and losers from rate changes, full delegation may not be 
possible, in which case we recommend a number of intermediate regimes.  We 
also discuss the use of the revenues, recommending a revenue neutral and 
distributionally neutral adjustment to the income or payroll taxes. 
The third design issue relates to trade in carbon intensive goods.  We 
argue that border tax adjustments for a carbon tax are necessary and appropriate.  
There is, however, no simple and clearly legal method of implementing a system 
of border tax adjustments to prevent so-called carbon leakage, the shifting of 
production to countries without a carbon pricing mechanism.  The key problem is 
that to set the border tax adjustment, we need information about the particular 
production technology and sources of energy used to produce an item, unlike with 
a VAT, where price is all that is needed.  The necessary information may be 
difficult to obtain.  We consider a number of possible options and their legality, 
recommending a system of presumptive border tax adjustments that allow 
individual firms to provide evidence of lower emissions.  The presumptive border 
tax can be based on either average emissions from the production of like products 
in the exporting country or in the importing country.  Using information from the 
                                                 
3 The optimal tax rate in a second-best world is a bit more complicated.  We discuss this further 
below. 
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exporting country is preferable but obtaining that information may be more 
difficult and using it raises additional trade-related legal issues. 
 Cap and trade systems are currently the favored carbon-pricing 
mechanism.  The EU uses a cap and trade system for compliance with the Kyoto 
Protocol and cap and trade systems are prominently under consideration in the 
U.S. Congress.  Although there are many reasons for preferring a tax,4 if a cap 
and trade system is ultimately adopted, most of the design issues for the tax will 
be relevant for a cap and trade system.  For example, it is likely that we will want 
to use the same point in production for remittance of a tax and for the imposition 
of a permit requirement.  Similarly, carbon leakage raises similar issues under a 
cap and trade regime and under a tax.  Thus, a detailed consideration of how to 
implement a carbon tax can inform the discussion of how best to implement a cap 
and trade system should a cap and trade system end up being chosen as the carbon 
pricing mechanism.5 
 Our focus here is on a tax implemented in a developed country.  We have 
the U.S. in mind, and use U.S. data, but the considerations may be similar in other 
developed countries even if some particulars change.  Other issues may arise in 
developing countries, where, for example, tax enforcement is not as robust and 
                                                 
4 The literature is large.  For a small sample, see WEITZMAN, M. (1974): "Prices Vs. Quantities," 
Review of Economic Studies, 41, 477-491., ROBERTS, M. J., and M. SPENCE (1976): "Effluent 
Charges and Licenses under Uncertainty," Journal of Public Economics, 5, 193-208., HOEL, M., 
and L. KARP (2002): "Taxes Versus Quotas for a Stock Pollutant," Resource and Energy 
Economics, 24, 367-384., KARP, L., and J. ZHANG (2005): "Regulation of Stock Externalities with 
Correlated Abatement Costs," Environmental and Resource Economics, 32, 273-299., NORDHAUS, 
W. D. (2007): "To Tax or Not to Tax: Alternative Approaches to Slowing Global Warming," 
Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 1, 26-44.  Most of these discussions focus on 
theoretical issues such as the deadweight loss from error.  We note that from an administrative 
perspective a carbon tax can be more quickly implemented than a cap and trade system.  Coal 
producers already pay an excise tax to fund the Black Lung Trust Fund and oil producers pay a tax 
to fund the Oil Spill Trust Fund (see METCALF, G. E. (2007): "Federal Tax Policy toward Energy," 
Tax Policy and the Economy, 21, 145-184. for a description of these funds). We also have 
precedents for refundable credits for sequestration activities in federal fuels tax credits. In contrast, 
we have no administrative structure in place for running a carbon cap-and-trade program.  The 
Acid Rain Program is a helpful precedent but the value of permits is an order of magnitude smaller 
than the potential value of carbon emission permits.  It also was highly concentrated among a 
small set of electric utilities. 
5 Some issues will be different.  For example, a cap and trade system will likely need a so-called 
safety value or price ceiling as well as a price floor, and there are a number of design issues in 
setting the ceiling and flow that are not present in a carbon tax.  BURTRAW, D., and K. PALMER 
(2006): "Dynamic Adjustment to Incentive Based Policy to Improve Efficiency and Performance," 
Washington, DC: Resources for the Future. 
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where the sources of emissions are likely to be very different (for example, 
agriculture and deforestation will play a larger role and energy a smaller role in 
developing countries).   
 Our goal is to consider the design of an ideal tax, a tax that best trades off 
the internalization of emissions externalities with administrative and collection 
costs.  We do not generally consider the political concessions that will be 
necessary to enact the tax, leaving that to the give and take of the political 
process.  Although we understand that a tax as actually enacted will likely be 
different than an ideal tax, a model tax is still useful; it can act as a baseline that 
the political process can work off of and as a comparison.   
 Part I provides background on greenhouse gas emissions and the various 
regulatory regimes used currently to control them.  Part II discusses principles 
related to setting the rate, including also the use of the tax revenues and adjusting 
for the distributive effects of the tax.  Part III considers the tax base.  It begins 
with a discussion of the theory of setting the optimal base and then turns to the 
detail the various production systems and discusses how best to collect a tax on 
various types of emissions.  Part IV considers sequestration and other carbon-
reducing activities that should receive tax credits.  Part V considers the interaction 
of a carbon tax and the trade rules.  Part VI considers interactions with other 
domestic regulations and taxes that affect carbon emissions.  Part VII concludes. 
I. Emissions and current control mechanisms 
 As background to understanding how best to design a carbon tax regime in 
the United States, we begin with a review of greenhouse gas emissions in the 
United States.  We also briefly review carbon pricing policies in other countries.   
A. Emissions 
The U.S. emitted about 7.0 billion metric tons of CO2 equivalents in 2006, 
roughly 20 percent of worldwide emissions.6  This amount consists of emissions 
of CO2 (80% of the total) and emissions of other gases such as methane and 
nitrous oxide that also contribute to the greenhouse effect.  It is conventional to 
convert the emissions of other gases to CO2 equivalent amounts (CO2e) by 
determining how much CO2 would have to be emitted to have the same effect on 
                                                 
6 Net emissions in the United States– gross emissions less carbon sinks – were 6.2 billion metric 
tons (U. S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (2008): "Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions and Sinks: 1990-2006."  Carbon sinks are measured in the EPA report as those arising 
from land use, land use changes, and forestry activities. 
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the climate.  The conversion factors are known as global warming potentials.7  
Methane, for example, has a 100 year global warming potential of 21, which 
means that a ton of methane has the same climate forcing impact as 21 tons of 
CO2.  All of the numbers used here are in CO2e units. 
 About 80 percent of U.S. emissions in 2006 were from the combustion of 
fossil fuel.8  Petroleum use makes up about 43 percent of this total, coal makes up 
                                                 
7 Calculation of global warming potentials is not straightforward.  The problem is that different 
gases have different lifetimes in the atmosphere, so determining the global warming potential 
involves aggregating over time.  Current inventories of greenhouse gas emissions use the  100 
year global warming potentials calculated by the IPCC Second Assessment Report 1996 and are 
listed in the most recent IPCC Report, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (2007): 
"Climate Change 2007 -- the Physical Science Basis, Contribution of Working Group I to the 
Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC," Cambridge University Press. Table TS.2, page 33.  To 
avoid some of the problems with discounting, the IPCC also reports the global warming potentials 
over various time periods.  The following is a selection of 100 global warming potentials for 
important gases along with their associated U.S. emissions in carbon equivalents in million metric 
ton units: 
Table X.  GWP’s and 2006 Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
 CO2e (MMT) GWP 
Carbon Dioxide 5,983.1 1 
Methane 555.3 21 
Nitrous Oxide 367.9 310 
HFCs 124.5 140 to 11,700 
PFCs 6.0 6,500 to 9,200 
Sulfur Hexaflouride 17.3 23,900 
Total 7,054.2  
Source: EPA (2008), Tables ES-1 and ES-2 
 
8 Parties to the UN Framework Convention for Climate Change (UNFCCC) must provide 
inventories of their carbon emissions.  The U.S. inventory is done by the Environmental Protection 
Agency following guidelines set by the International Panel on Climate Change pursuant to the 
UNFCCC.  The most recent data is for 2006.  U. S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 
(2008): "Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990-2006.", and our data is 
based on this source. 
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37 percent, and natural gas makes up the remaining 20 percent.  Non-energy uses 
of fossil fuel as well as other miscellaneous uses (such as for international 
bunkers to supply fuel for shipping) add a modest amount of additional emissions.  
Of the three fossil fuels, coal has the highest carbon content per unit of energy 
(with the amount varying by type of coal), then petroleum, and then natural gas.  
See Figure X.9 
 
 The four major end uses of fossil fuels are industrial, transportation, 
residential, and commercial.  Transportation makes up the largest category of 
emissions, making up about 33 percent of fossil fuel emissions (and 26 percent of 
all U.S. emissions).  Transportation emissions come almost exclusively from 
petroleum.  Over 60 percent of transportation emissions are from personal vehicle 
use with most of the rest from heavy-duty vehicles and jet fuel.   
Industrial uses of fossil fuels make up 27 percent of emissions from fossil 
fuels (22 percent of the total emissions).  About half of these come from direct 
combustion of fossil fuels to produce steam or heat for industrial processes and 
the other half from electricity use by industry.  Residential and commercial end-
use make up the rest of emissions from fossil fuel combustion, relying heavily on 
                                                 
9  Data from EIA Voluntary Reporting of Greenhouse Gases website at 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/techassist.html and accessed on May 27, 2008. 
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electricity, with the remaining amount natural gas or petroleum for heating and 
cooking.   
Electricity acts as an intermediate source of emissions – emissions result 
from the generation of electricity which is then used by consumers in the various 
categories listed above (industrial, commercial, residential, and transportation).  
Emissions from the generation of electricity were included in the end-use 
numbers reported above.  Looking at electricity as a separate category, it accounts 
for 36 percent of the energy from fossil fuels in the U.S. and 41 percent of CO2 
emissions from fossil fuel combustion.  The type of fuel used for electricity 
generation has a significant effect on emissions.  Electricity can be generated 
through non-emitting methods such as hydroelectric, nuclear, or geothermal 
energy, as well as through combustion of natural gas and coal.  Almost all coal 
used in the U.S. (93 percent) is used for electricity generation.  Conventional use 
of coal to generate electricity is by far the highest emitting method of generating 
electricity.  The following graphic summarizes U.S. fossil fuel emissions, keeping 
electricity as a separate category.  Environmental Protection Agency (2008) Table 
3.1  
 
 By comparison to emissions from fossil fuels, emissions from other 
sources are small.  The table below gives a list of the major sources in the U.S.  
Once we move away from fossil fuels, the various sources of emissions quickly 
become, as a relative matter, very small.  The top non-fossil-fuel-combustion 
item, agricultural soils management, produced 265 million metric tons of CO2 
‐
500 
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2,000 
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Residential Commercial Industrial Transportation Electicity
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equivalents in 2006 while fossil fuel combustion produced 5,637 million metric 
tons, more than 21 times the amount.  Cement production caused direct emissions 
of 45 million metric tons of CO2 (i.e., emissions associated with the production 
process itself, not from the fossil fuel energy used in the process), which is less 
than one one-hundredth of fossil fuel emissions.  Nevertheless, these sources 
together make up about 20 percent of U.S. emissions. 
GHG Sources above 20 MMT CO2e in 2006 
 
Rank Source Gas 
MMT 
CO2e 
% of 
Total 
Cumulative 
% 
1. Fossil Fuels CO2 5,637.0 79.9% 79.9% 
2. Agricultural Soil Management N2O 265.0 3.8% 83.7% 
3. Nonenergy Use of Fuels CO2 138.0 2.0% 85.6% 
4. Landfills Methane 132.0 1.9% 87.5% 
5. Enteric Fermentation Methane 126.2 1.8% 89.3% 
6. ODS Substitutes HFC 110.4 1.6% 90.8% 
7. Natural Gas Systems (methane) Methane 102.4 1.5% 92.3% 
8. Coal Mining Methane 58.5 0.8% 93.1% 
9. Iron and Steel Production CO2 49.1 0.7% 93.8% 
10. Cement Manufacturing CO2 45.7 0.6% 94.5% 
11. Manure Management Methane 41.4 0.6% 95.1% 
12. Mobile Combustion N2O 33.1 0.5% 95.5% 
13. Petroleum Systems Methane 28.4 0.4% 95.9% 
14. Natural Gas Systems (CO2) CO2 28.2 0.4% 96.3% 
15. Forest land remaining forest Methane 24.6 0.3% 96.7% 
16. 
Municipal Wastewater 
Treatment Methane 23.9 0.3% 97.0% 
17. Solid Waste Combustion CO2 20.9 0.3% 97.3% 
  Total 6,864.8   
 U.S. Total 7,054.2    
Source:  2008 EPA Greenhouse Gas Inventory 
  
While emissions from each of these sources are relatively small, some of 
these sources are good candidates for inclusion in the tax base.  As we will 
discuss below, in determining what should be taxed, we care about marginal 
abatement costs – how much emissions can be reduced if an additional dollar 
were spent trying to do so – rather than the total size of emissions from a given 
source.  The reason is that to minimize the total cost of abatement, the tax base 
must include low marginal abatement cost items even if their total contribution to 
emissions is small.   For example, if it is easy to reduce methane emissions from 
landfills, it may be important to include them in the tax base notwithstanding the 
modest amount of these emissions.  Many items with low marginal abatement 
costs will be unrelated to fossil fuels.  Reilly, J., H. D. Jacoby and R. G. Prinn 
(2003) 
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 Worldwide emissions of greenhouse gases were 42 million metric tons of 
CO2 equivalents in 2000.  Stern, N. (2007) p 195; World Resources Institute 
(2006).  Energy use is a relatively smaller component of the worldwide total than 
it is for the U.S., comprising just over 60 percent of worldwide emissions 
(compared to 80 percent of U.S. emissions).  Land use change, particularly 
deforestation is a larger contributor worldwide than it is in the U.S., contributing 
18.2 percent of emissions worldwide and a negligible amount for the U.S.  
Preventing deforestation in Indonesia and Brazil in particular is likely a low-cost 
method of abatement and, therefore, important to include in a global climate 
policy.  Similarly, emissions from agriculture make up about 13.5 percent of 
worldwide emissions but only 6.2 percent of U.S. emissions. 
B Existing Carbon Control Regimes 
Neither the U.S. nor the rest of the world makes any significant use of 
taxes explicitly on carbon.  There are currently six taxes explicitly on carbon (five 
Scandinavian countries, and the UK).  There are, however, a wide variety of taxes 
on, and subsidies for, energy (as well as a wide variety of regulatory regimes for 
other greenhouse gases).  These taxes and subsidies will affect carbon emissions, 
although because they are on energy rather than carbon, they will not be designed 
to set a uniform price for carbon across different types of energy.  Baranzini, A., 
J. Goldemberg and S. Speck (2000) survey energy taxes in 12 countries as of 
2000, finding that the vast majority of energy taxes are on gasoline and diesel 
fuel, with very few taxes on coal and natural gas.   
All of the Scandinavian countries adopted carbon taxes in the 1990s.  
These taxes have narrow bases and do not impose a uniform tax on emissions 
from the sources that they do cover.  Instead, they provide a wide variety of 
different rates.  Bruvoll, A. and B. M. Larsen (2004)  The Norwegian carbon tax 
covers about 60 percent of energy-related CO2 emissions and 46 percent of total 
emissions. 10   Stern, N. (2007) (Box 15.4, p. 386) and Ekins, P. and T. Barker 
(2001)  According to Stern, the impact of the tax was weakened because of 
numerous exemptions related to competitive concerns.  Moreover, the tax did not 
accurately reflect emissions from various fuels.  Finally, notwithstanding that all 
of the Scandinavian countries adopted carbon taxes and that, compared to 
differences around the globe, the Scandinavian countries are relatively similar, 
they were unable to harmonize their taxes. 
                                                 
10 Norway’s emissions from energy in 2000 were 41.1 million metric tons and total emissions 
were 53.8 million metric tons of CO2 equivalents. See BJOTVEIT, I. (2005): "National Inventory 
Report 2005 Norway, Greenhouse Gas Emissions 1990-2003 Reported According to the Unfccc 
Guidelines." for the Norwegian greenhouse gas inventory. 
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The U.K. imposed a climate tax (known as the climate change levy or 
CCL) in 2001.  The levy is on industrial and commercial use of energy.  
Transportation and domestic use of energy are excluded.  The rate is currently 
modest.  For example, electricity is charged as £4.41 per megawatt hour.  Gas is 
taxed at £1.54 per megawatt hour.  Moreover, taxpayers can enter into agreements 
with the government to reduce emissions in exchange for a significantly reduced 
rate of tax, effectively converting the climate change levy into a command and 
control regulation.  Total collections from the levy are around £1 billion annually. 
If the United States were to adopt a carbon tax, an important design issue 
would be how it interacted with other carbon pricing and energy policies both 
domestically and abroad.  Internationally, the major program with which a 
domestic tax would have to interact is the European Union Emissions Trading 
Scheme (ETS).  The ETS is a cap and trade program on EU emissions from the 
energy industry plus energy-intensive industries.  Phase I of the ETS ran from 
2005 through 2007 and was viewed as a trial run to develop the market 
mechanisms to support permit trading.  Phase II running from 2008 through 2012 
is designed to help the EU meet its Kyoto obligation of an eight percent reduction 
below the base year levels (generally 1990).  The burden sharing allocation within 
the EU is complex and Ellerman, A. D., B. Buchner and C. Carraro (2007) 
describe it in detail. 
 We do not discuss the merits of the ETS in this paper but do wish to 
comment on two aspects of its design.  First, the EU system was implemented at 
the electric utility and industry level.  This significantly multiplies the number of 
covered installations and makes a comprehensive system difficult to implement.  
Second, the ETS only covers a relatively small portion of greenhouse gas 
emissions in the EU.  According to Convery, F. J. and L. Redmond (2007) the 
European Commission estimates that less than half of CO2 emissions and less 
than one-third of all greenhouse gas emissions will be subject to the ETS caps in 
2010.  In particular, the transportation sector is excluded.  It has been argued that 
the transport sector was excluded from the ETS because it was already subject to 
high taxes on motor fuels (see Metcalf, G. E. (2008) for a comparison of US and 
EU gasoline tax rates).  These taxes on motor fuels, however, were presumably 
motivated by other externalities associated with driving.  Therefore, these taxes 
need to be imposed in addition to rather than as a replacement for, a carbon tax.  
Moreover, to the extent that an element of these taxes relates to carbon emissions, 
nothing precluded the EU from including transport in the ETS and encouraging 
member countries to impose motor fuels taxes only to the extent of non-carbon 
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externalities from driving.11  To the extent EU motor fuels taxes are to be thought 
of as part of their carbon pricing regime, the EU has a hybrid cap and trade, tax 
regime rather than a pure cap and trade regime.   
 None of these carbon pricing regimes services as a good model for the 
design of a carbon tax.  All have comparatively narrow bases, and are none are 
imposed so as to minimize compliance and administrative costs. 
II. Rates 
A. Setting the Rates 
At the most basic level, the principles for setting the correct tax rate were 
established long ago by Pigou: the tax rate should equal the social marginal 
damages from an additional unit of emissions.  Because marginal damages change 
with emissions, the tax rate needs to change as well; the tax rate schedule is 
simply the marginal damages curve.  Emitters facing this tax schedule would 
internalize the cost and set emissions at a level that equalizes the cost to their 
marginal benefit from emitting.  To impose such a tax, the government would 
only need the information required to estimate marginal damages and would not 
need information about the costs of abatement.   
It is conventional to illustrate this idea using the marginal benefit from 
reducing emissions rather than the marginal damages of increasing emissions.  
The basic idea is the same and the tax rate schedule under this approach is the 
marginal benefit curve.  Emitters would set their individual marginal cost of 
abatement equal to the marginal tax rate.  Graph x below illustrates. 
                                                 
11 One obstacle to this swap is that the permits were given away and so national governments 
would lose revenue.  But the amounts in question are small.  Average gasoline tax rates in OECD 
countries other than the United States averaged $2.30 per gallon as of January 2007 according to 
the OECD database on environmental taxes at http://www2.oecd.org/ecoinst/queries/  (accessed on 
May 8, 2008).  At the current price for ETS permits in the neighborhood of €26, this would raise 
the price of gasoline by about 35¢ per gallon.  A modest amount of auctioning would allow 
countries to recoup revenue lost by a gasoline tax offset to transport fuel permit price increases. 
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If the tax has to be set at a fixed rate, say, $x per metric ton of CO2, as is 
likely in any broad-based tax, the optimal tax would be where the marginal cost of 
abatement equals the marginal benefit.  (In the chart above, this is labeled t*.  The 
revenue raised is equal to the shaded rectangle.)  To set such a tax, the 
government would need to estimate the marginal cost of abatement as well as the 
marginal benefit from abatement.  This is a more difficult task because the 
government needs information about both the marginal damages and marginal 
costs of abatement. 
There are a wide range of estimates of the optimal tax rate.  The 
calculation is difficult, perhaps even heroic, because it involves combining 
uncertain science, such as the predicting the local effects of climate change, with 
predictions of economic and technological developments far in the future, and 
discounting those values to the present.  The IPCC’s Working Group II surveys 
100 different studies of the optimal tax rate and estimates a mean for 2005 of $12 
per metric ton of CO2, but notes that estimates range from $3 to $95 per ton.  
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2007), p. 16).  The report goes on 
to note that these estimates are likely to underestimate the costs of carbon 
emissions because of the difficulty in quantifying many impacts.  The revenue 
raised from such a tax would depend on the coverage and on the elasticity of 
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emissions to taxation, but rough and ready figures suggest a modest tax would 
likely raise between $75 and $100 billion per year.12 
Because of the difficulties in computing the optimal tax rate, an alternative 
taken by some analysts is to determine a set of taxes over time that result in 
meeting a target for emissions reductions or total carbon concentrations in the 
atmosphere.  This approach separates the analysis into two components:  an 
overall social decision about what level of greenhouse gas concentrations we are 
willing to tolerate and a technical solution to how best achieve that goal.  When 
analysts take this approach and use likely targets, the ranges of tax rates they 
produce are similar to those from trying to find the social cost of carbon.13 
There is a longstanding debate about whether the tax rate should be 
adjusted because of interactions with the labor tax.  Bovenberg, A. L. and R. A. 
de Mooij (1994), Goulder, L. H., I. Parry and D. Burtraw (1997), Fullerton, D. 
and G. E. Metcalf (1998).  The original view was that environmental taxes create 
a “double dividend” because they internalize environmental externalities and 
allow the distorting income tax to be reduced by the revenue that they raise.  The 
most recent view is that the extent to which, and even the direction of an 
adjustment to environmental taxes, depends on subtle factors, such as whether 
there are pre-existing regulatory regimes and the use of the revenues, rather than a 
priori economic reasoning.  For example, environmental taxes themselves may 
reduce labor supply much the same way as a labor tax and, therefore, substituting 
an environmental tax for a labor tax may not reduce such distortions.  Regardless 
of the details of this debate, given the heroic assumptions needed to compute the 
optimal carbon tax rate, the double dividend hypothesis is to a large extent second 
order – determining the carbon tax rate at this point involves guessing about 
orders of magnitude and not about potentially subtle adjustments.   
                                                 
12METCALF, G. E., S. PALSTEV, J. REILLY, H. D. JACOBY, and J. HOLAK (2008): "Analysis of U.S. 
Greenhouse Gas Tax Proposals," Cambridge: MIT., Table 9, provides revenue estimates for 
several carbon tax bills.  Their estimates for revenue raised in 2015 from relatively narrow taxes 
range from $69 billion to $126 billion.  To put this in context, a carbon tax of $25 per metric ton 
CO2 would raise the price of gasoline by about 22¢ per gallon and the price of coal fired electricity 
by roughly 2.5¢ per kWh.  A carbon tax would also increase the price of other commodities that 
use energy as an intermediate good.  HASSETT, K. A., A. MATHUR, and G. E. METCALF (2009): 
"The Incidence of a U.S. Carbon Tax: A Lifetime and Regional Analysis," The Energy Journal, 
30, 157-179. estimate that a $25 per ton tax would raise the purchase price of a new automobile by 
about 1.5 percent. 
13 For a comparison of economic models of climate change using similar emissions scenarios, see 
CLARK, L. E., J. A. EDMONDS, H. D. JACOBY, H. M. PITCHER, J. REILLY, and R. G. RICHELS 
(2007): "Scenarios of Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Atmopheric Concentrations, Synthesis and 
Assessment Product 2.1a." 
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B. Revenue and Redistribution 
Depending on one's frame of reference, a carbon tax is likely to be modest 
to highly regressive.  Table X shows the distributional burden of a $15 per ton 
carbon tax across households using data from 2003.14   
Table X.  Carbon Tax Burden Across Income Groups 
Income 
Decile Direct Indirect Total 
Bottom 2.12 1.60 3.74 
Second 1.74 1.31 3.06 
Third 1.36 0.99 2.36 
Fourth 1.19 0.88 2.06 
Fifth 0.97 0.78 1.76 
Sixth 0.85 0.68 1.53 
Seventh 0.69 0.61 1.30 
Eighth 0.61 0.63 1.23 
Ninth 0.53 0.49 1.01 
Top 0.36 0.45 0.81 
Source: Hassett, Mathur, and Metcalf (2009).  The table reports the within decile average carbon tax 
burdens as a percentage of income.  Direct burden refers to fuel consumption.  Indirect burden refers to 
higher prices of goods due to use of energy as an input.  The sum of direct and indirect differ from 
total due to rounding error. 
 
. 
Based on the practice in European VAT systems of zero rating and 
exemptions, one might ask whether similar exemptions should be built into the 
carbon tax to reduce its regressivity.  The answer is no.  Instead, the distributive 
effects of a carbon tax should be offset through adjustments to the overall tax 
system (and in particular, the income tax) rather than through the design of the 
carbon tax itself.  The reason is that attempts to redistribute through adjustments 
to a commodity tax are in general less efficient than adjustments to direct taxes.  
Atkinson, A. B. and J. E. Stiglitz (1976), Kaplow, L. (2006)  In particular, 
adjusting the carbon tax for distributive effects produces the same types of 
distortions that adjustments to labor income taxes do.  For example, progressive 
                                                 
14 HASSETT, K. A., A. MATHUR, and G. E. METCALF (2009): "The Incidence of a U.S. Carbon Tax: 
A Lifetime and Regional Analysis," The Energy Journal, 30, 157-179. use both annual income 
and two measures of lifetime income to distribute the tax across households.  Using a lifetime 
income measure reduces the regressivity of the tax considerably.  METCALF, G. E., S. PALTSEV, J. 
M. REILLY, H. D. JACOBY, A. GURGEL, A. SOKOLOV, and J. HOLAK (2008): "Analysis of a Carbon 
Tax to Reduce U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions," Cambridge, MA: MIT Joint Program on the 
Science and Policy of Global Change. show that over time more of the carbon tax is passed back 
to resource owners and owners of capital also mitigating the regressivity somewhat. 
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taxes reduce work incentives.  In addition, adjusting the carbon tax for distributive 
effects would reduce the environmental benefits of the tax: carbon emissions 
would not be priced equal to their marginal damages.  Therefore, the better 
approach is to design the carbon tax to best internalize the effects of emissions 
and to adjust the income or payroll tax for any distributive effects. 
The geographic disparities of a carbon tax could pose an additional 
distributive problem.  The geographic disparities, however, appear to modest.  
Table X from Hassett, K. A., A. Mathur and G. E. Metcalf (2009) gives a recent 
estimate of these effects. 
Table X.  Carbon Tax Burden Across Regions 
 
Region Direct Indirect Total 
New England 0.73 0.76 1.47 
Mid Atlantic 0.75 0.76 1.50 
South Atlantic 0.87 0.77 1.62 
East South Central 1.19 0.75 1.92 
East North Central 1.05 0.76 1.79 
West North Central 0.84 0.77 1.59 
West South Central 1.08 0.78 1.84 
Mountain 0.85 0.91 1.73 
Pacific 0.74 0.81 1.54 
Source: Hassett, Mathur, and Metcalf  (2009).  The table reports the within region average carbon tax burdens as a 
percentage of income.  The sum of direct and indirect differs from total due to rounding error.
 
To a large extent, the design of a carbon tax is separable from the issue of 
how to spend the money.  Moreover, as noted, the potentially regressive 
distributive effects of a carbon tax should be offset through adjustments to the 
income tax rather than through adjustments in the design of the carbon tax, so 
distributive issues are also separable.  Nevertheless, because the revenue and 
distributive effects are significant, it is worth a few words on these issues.  We 
consider two alternatives. 
Our first and preferred option is to maintain revenue and distributional 
neutrality.  The reason would be that whatever the decision is on proper size of 
government and proper deficit, the enactment of carbon tax does not change it.  
So if the current judgment, right or wrong, is that the federal government should 
be 19 percent of the economy, the enactment of a carbon tax should not change 
this.  Similarly, whatever our decision is on proper degree of progressivity of the 
tax system, the enactment of a carbon tax does not change these views.  Under 
this argument, carbon tax revenues should be used to reduce other taxes in a way 
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that maintains progressivity.  Metcalf, G. E. (2007) provides an example of such a 
proposal. 
Even if other taxes are adjusted to maintain overall progressivity, a carbon 
tax will have a disproportionate impact on certain industries, with the coal 
industry being a prime example.  Because of its very high carbon content and the 
size of emissions from coal combustion, we could not exempt coal from an 
effective carbon tax.  This suggests the need for transition assistance for coal 
industry workers who would be displaced as a result of a carbon policy. Such 
assistance need not be that expensive.  
The value added by the coal industry (labor compensation, owners’ 
profits, and indirect business taxes) amounted to $11 billion in 2005.  If the share 
of labor compensation in coal mining value added is unchanged from 1997 when 
labor accounted for one-half the value added in coal mining, the maximum 
potential loss to labor is $6.5 billion annually.  Demand will fall sharply but not to 
zero, so the loss in value added will be less than $11 billion annually.  Moreover, 
as time goes on, participants in this industry can begin to make adjustments to 
move into other sectors. Thus any transitional assistance should be temporary in 
nature with particular attention paid to those factors that are least able to transition 
to new jobs (e.g., older workers). 
A second option is to spend some of the tax revenue to help shift toward a 
low-carbon economy.  It is certainly the case that an increase in federal research 
funding for basic energy-related research and development would be beneficial.  
A number of studies suggest that a doubling of such funding over a five to seven 
year period could be spent productively (e.g. Furman, J., J. E. Bordoff, M. 
Deshpande and P. J. Noel (2007)).  This would require funds in the range of $3 
billion per year in addition to what is currently spent.  This amount could be 
funded by removing subsidies to energy production which are either unproductive 
or unnecessary in the presence of a carbon tax.  By no means would it be sensible 
to spend all the carbon tax revenue on basic R&D.   
Some funding will also be needed to move to advanced technologies at 
scale such as carbon capture and storage.  The recent setback in funding for 
Future Gen is unfortunate and speaks to the large financial risks facing firms if 
they try to undertake such investments on their own.  Carbon capture and storage 
(CCS) illustrates another set of issues requiring government action.  A national 
CCS system will require a network of pipelines to move carbon from generators 
to storage sites.  This may require some funding by the government.15  Similarly, 
                                                 
15 While funding will be required to build this network, as important will be a review and potential 
overhaul of state and federal regulatory systems to remove obstacles to the development of this 
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low-carbon sources of energy, such as wind, may not be located near population 
centers, which means that an enhanced transmission grid may be required.  Given 
the complex regulatory and land use issues in building such a grid, federal 
involvement and funding may be necessary.   
In addition, enhanced support for energy efficiency investments 
contributes to a reduction in energy consumption and carbon emissions.  
Increasing energy prices through a carbon tax will contribute to increased 
efficiency investments to be sure but two factors suggest benefits from more 
generous tax credits for efficiency investments: First, certain sectors of the 
economy may not respond to energy price increases arising from a carbon policy. 
Commercial real estate and rental housing are sectors where the economic agent 
who makes efficiency investments (developer or homeowner) is not the person 
who benefits from the energy savings (tenant). Second, the hidden nature of many 
efficiency improvements makes it difficult to recapture the energy savings 
through their capitalization into building prices or rents. In addition, empirical 
work suggests that efficiency investment tax credits have a substantial impact on 
efficiency investments (see Hassett, K. and G. E. Metcalf (1995)). 
In summary, we believe that in large measure funds from a carbon tax 
should be used as part of a carbon tax swap that is revenue and distributionally 
neutral.  A small portion of the funds might be directed to transition relief for 
displaced workers, basic energy R&D, to providing support to solve vexing issues 
associated with bringing CCS to scale, to help construct any necessary 
transmission lines, and perhaps to encourage conservation activities that market 
imperfections might otherwise block.  But we reiterate that the decision on how to 
spend carbon tax revenues is separate from the decision to enact a carbon tax.   
C. Initial enactment and grandfathering 
There are a number of choices regarding how to impose a carbon tax in its 
initial period, the most important being a slow ramp-up of the tax, grandfathering 
existing emissions, or a cold-turkey introduction.  A slow ramp up would 
gradually introduce the tax over time, perhaps by starting with low initial rates or 
a narrow initial base and then increasing the rates or base at a preannounced 
schedule to reach the desired system.  Grandfathering would exempt from 
taxation a baseline level of emissions, such as an amount equal to emissions in a 
                                                                                                                                     
network.  Important questions include at what level in our federal system will regulatory oversight 
of this network take place?  What is the right balance between national interests in a CCS system 
and local property rights?  Who will bear the liability if stored carbon leaks in the near or long 
term?  What insurance mechanisms will be necessary to cover that liability? 
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reference year.  Cold turkey would simply introduce the tax without any special 
provision for transition.   
While cold turkey is likely the least politically feasible approach, it is our 
preferred approach.  There are two reasons.  First, cold-turkey introduction 
maximizes what we might call the “anticipation effect.”  If businesses understand 
today that the eventual carbon tax will be imposed without special relief for 
existing investments, they will start adjusting their behavior now, anticipating the 
future effects of the tax.  For example, a utility constructing a power plant now is 
more likely to use gas instead of coal if it will be subject to a future tax on carbon 
emissions (gas being much less carbon intensive than coal).  We can, in effect, 
think of this as pushing some of the effects of the policy earlier in time, which in 
this case is a good thing.  Kaplow, L. (1986), Shaviro, D. (2000). 
The usual argument against this sort of anticipation effect is that 
individuals act or should be allowed to act without trying to guess future 
government policy – they should be allowed to rely on current law.  The 
government by passing current law has, in effect, told people what their 
compliance obligations are, and it is unfair to change that midstream.  This 
argument, however, is circular.  Individuals or industries only know they can rely 
on unchanging rules (or grandfathering if the rules do change) if there is some 
external reason why that should be the case.  For example, the Sixth Amendment 
to the Constitution allows property owners to rely on their rights to prevent 
government takings.  Taxes, however, change all the time and there is no fairness 
reason why people should be able to rely on them not changing.  This is 
particularly true with respect to a carbon tax as carbon pricing policies have been 
widely discussed for a long time. 
 Second, the revenues raised by a carbon tax are likely to be significant – 
in the range of $100 billion per year – and those revenues can likely be spent in 
better ways than grandfathering carbon emissions.  For example, the taxes could 
be used to reduce the income or payroll taxes.  Alternatively, shifting to a low 
carbon economy may take significant changes in infrastructure and some of the 
tax revenues could be used to pay for those changes.  As implied in our discussion 
of the use of revenues, it is hard to imagine that there are not better ways to spend 
the money than giving it to industries that currently emit carbon.  Metcalf, G. E. 
(2007) shows that grandfathering the energy sector also has perverse 
distributional consequences.  The value of grandfathered permits accrues to 
owners of capital thereby exacerbating the undesirable distributional 
consequences of carbon pricing. 
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  A slow ramp up can be seen simply as an intermediate solution between 
grandfathering and cold turkey.  It is like grandfathering that is phased out over 
time.  Therefore, the same arguments apply to the extent the phase in is like 
grandfathering. 
Note that the possibility of grandfathering a carbon tax based on business 
as usual emissions allows a carbon tax to have the same effect as a cap and trade 
system with free allocation of permits, if such a system were to be desired.  In 
particular, one claim that a cap and trade system is more efficient than a tax is if 
blocking industries must be bought off to allow legislation to pass, a cap and trade 
system can do so relatively efficiently through the free allocation of allowances.  
This is relatively efficient because the blocking industry would still face the right 
price at the margin – it would benefit from any increase or decrease in emissions 
by an amount equal to the price of the permits.  A tax, it is claimed, must exempt 
the industry to buy it off, which is less efficient.  This, however, is not true.  An 
identical economic outcome can be obtained in a carbon tax by taxing emissions 
above some floor.  This preserves the impact at the margin while exempting initial 
emissions in a lump sum fashion.16 
D. Anticipated Rate Schedule 
The optimal schedule of tax rates will depend on how the target is being 
set.  In a welfare maximizing framework where the benefits and costs of carbon 
abatement are both taken into account the tax rate should match social marginal 
damages across time.17  Where the goal is to cap emissions at some fixed amount 
over a set time period, the tax rate should grow at the rate of return on capital.18  
Metcalf, G. E., S. Palstev, J. Reilly, H. D. Jacoby and J. Holak (2008) develop the 
argument as follows.  They start by imagining that we issued permits instead of 
taxes, issuing today the set of permits that can be used over time.  The permits 
would be an asset.  Holders would save that asset for later use if its value went up 
faster than the rate of return on other assets and use it sooner if its value when up 
slower.  In equilibrium, therefore permits will increase at the same rate as the 
return on other forms of capital.  Taxes and permits, however, are merely 
substitute methods of imposing the Pigouvian price on emissions in the absence of 
                                                 
16 An interesting issue we have yet fully resolved is why the EU Emissions Trading System 
required participating countries to freely allocate permits instead of giving each local country the 
choice.  This is particularly puzzling in light of the inefficiency of free allocation.   
17   This abstracts from the second-best considerations discussed above.  
18   This abstracts away from risk or multiple forms of capital with different return characteristics. 
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uncertainty.  Therefore, if permits optimally have this price pattern, taxes must as 
well. 
Nordhaus, W. D. (2008) undertakes an explicit welfare-maximizing 
analysis and finds that tax rates grow over time at a pattern that is similar to but 
not exactly exponential.  His model includes population growth, technology 
changes, and non-constant discount rates.  If there are technological surprises, the 
optimal tax rate will also adjust to take these into account.  In general, in broad-
based general equilibrium models we would expect the optimal tax rate to grow at 
an underlying exponential growth rate that is modified by other forces at work in 
the model. 
The real world is significantly more complicated than even the most 
complex computable general equilibrium model.  Multiple forms of capital exist 
with different rates of return based on their risk characteristics.  What is the right 
capital return to benchmark the growth of the carbon tax rate?  The logic of 
Metcalf et al. suggests that the appropriate capital return to use is that with similar 
risk characteristics to the hypothetical permit program that is equivalent to the 
carbon tax.  But immediately the logic breaks down since taxes and permit 
systems are no longer equivalent in a world with uncertainty.   
In practice the best we may be able to do is set out a given real growth rate 
for the tax rate (say, 4 or 5 percent real) in carbon tax legislation and anticipate 
the need to adjust the rate as more information becomes available.  We turn next 
to this issue. 
E. Rate changes 
Tax rates must be adjusted to reflect new information about the marginal 
cost and marginal benefit of abatement.  We are likely to get new information 
about these all the time as the science of climate change progresses and as 
abatement technologies are discovered and developed.  The question is how often 
to change the tax rate. 
Many commentators have expressed concerns over the price volatility 
associated with cap and trade systems because of worries that price volatility will 
reduce or delay long-term investment.  It is not clear, however, why carbon prices 
are different than any other sort of price.  The price of a barrel of oil changes all 
the time, and yet markets function and investment takes place.  Those who need 
price stability use futures markets or other hedging techniques.  On the other 
hand, there is a belief in the value of stability in law, expressed in the judicial 
doctrine of stare decisis.  We do not know in general how important stability in 
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the law is.  The costs and benefits of rapid changes to carbon prices, therefore, 
remain unknown. 
We need not resolve the issue of the optimal pace of change for laws – 
there is surprisingly little literature addressing this point – because most 
significant abatement opportunities involve long-term investments, such as the 
structure of the power industry.  This means that there will be little benefit from 
adjusting rates in the short run.  Thus, if a utility is considering the design of a 
power plant that has a 50 year life, it probably would matter little whether the 
carbon tax were to adjust every year or every five years.  If there is any cost to 
frequent changes, therefore, less frequent changes would be preferred.   
The question for the design of a carbon tax is whether there is some 
mechanism for causing intelligent rate changes to happen at regular intervals.  
One possibility is to delegate the responsibility to set the rate to an expert agency.  
An agency would have the advantage of being able to revisit the rate at regular 
intervals and the advantage of experts who are able to distill the complex 
information needed to determine the correct rate.  Agencies commonly set prices 
for significant items when they set electricity, airfares, and railroad rates.  
Agencies have also been used to set tariffs.  Although many of these pricing 
decisions are now made in the private market, the government must set the tax 
rate and these examples illustrate the feasibility of delegation of similar 
decisions.19 
If Congress is unwilling to delegate tax rate decisions of this scope to an 
agency – the revenue numbers are large and many important industries or regions 
can be hurt – intermediate solutions are available in which an agency recommends 
a rate and then various procedural rules force consideration of the 
recommendation by Congress or even perhaps even give procedural protection to 
the recommendation.  The military base closing commission might serve as an 
example.  An even more mild form of delegation is to require a commission to 
meet on a regular basis to recommend rates.  Although most commissions have 
little effect, there have been some that have worked, notably the Greenspan social 
security commission.   
If an intermediate delegation system of this sort is not feasible, Congress 
might consider a system that forces reconsideration of the rate at regular intervals.  
                                                 
19 Various ways of framing the tax may change perceptions of whether delegation is appropriate.  
For example, if the tax is seen as a user fee, delegation may seem more appropriate.  Similarly, if 
carbon tax revenues are dedicated to a particular source, the entire system looks more like 
traditional agency action as compared to the setting of a tax rate that raises general revenues.   
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Two obvious possibilities are a pre-scheduled rate that either goes up quickly, 
forcing Congress to act to reduce it as necessary, or a rate that goes down quickly 
(i.e., the tax expires), forcing Congress to increase it.   
III. The Tax Base 
We begin the discussion of the carbon tax base with a review of the theory 
of how to set the base when there are measurement and collection costs.  We then 
turn to a discussion of particular sources of emissions, focusing first on fossil 
fuels and then on other sources of emissions. 
A. Theory 
Absent administrative, enforcement, and political costs, an ideal tax 
system would include all activities that produce climate externalities.  This 
includes emissions of all greenhouse gases from any activity, including not only 
energy usage but also agriculture, forestry, and industrial emissions.  Moreover, 
absent administrative costs, the tax would include not only emissions of gases but 
any climate forcing including, for example, changes to albedo caused by forestry 
activities.  (Trees at certain latitudes absorb sunlight, reducing albedo and causing 
warming.)   
There are, however, hundreds of sources of greenhouse gases in the U.S. 
and other countries, most very small contributors.  Moreover many sources of 
emissions may be hard to measure and tax.  To determine the optimal tax base, we 
must compare the administrative savings of a narrow base with the efficiency 
benefits of a broad base.  In particular, the tax base should be set so that the 
benefit of a small expansion in the base is equal to the increase in administrative 
or compliance costs.   
We can think of broadening the tax base as rotating the marginal 
abatement cost curve downward – a broader base will include more sources of 
abatement and therefore, reduce the cost for any given amount of abatement.  In 
figure X below, the steeper marginal abatement cost curve reflects a narrow tax 
base.  Broadening the base rotates the curve to the right and optimal abatement 
increases from AN to AB given the marginal benefit of abatement curve MB.   The 
marginal benefit from broadening the tax base is equal to triangle abc in the 
diagram.20 
                                                 
20   This abstracts from interactions with other tax distortions.  In a second-best world with pre-
existing distortions, lowering the environmental tax rate will have first-order efficiency gains not 
reflected in the diagram. 
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To determine whether it is desirable to add any particular item to the tax 
base, we have to determine the size of the relevant triangle and the administrative 
cost of taxing the item.  To determine this, we need to know the marginal 
abatement cost curves for various types of emissions and the costs of 
administering a tax on those items.  In our discussion below, we use the estimates 
of the marginal abatement costs produced by the EPA in 2006.  (EPA 2006).  We 
do not have data on the administrative costs of including various items in the tax 
base; we make judgments based on information about the relevant activity, but 
better data might lead to a revision of these judgments.  In general, items, with 
large opportunities for low-cost abatement and that are easy to monitor are 
candidates for inclusion in the tax base.   
We also note that there is also a set of complicated political 
considerations.  Adding items to the tax base increases the number of special 
interests that will oppose the tax.  At the same time broadening the base allows 
the tax rate to be lower overall, thereby possibly reducing opposition from those 
already in the base.   
A final tax base issue is whether to tax greenhouse gases on the basis of 
where the products giving rise to emissions are produced (an origin basis) or 
where the products are consumed (a destination basis).  This distinction matters 
where trade is involved.  We defer discussion of this point until section __ below 
but note here that we propose a modified origin basis.  We would levy a tax at the 
border on fossil fuel imports from countries that do not have a substantive carbon 
MACNarrow 
MACBroad 
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MB 
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c 
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pricing system in place.  Fossil fuel imports from countries that do have a carbon 
pricing system in place would not be subject to a border tax.  This principle would 
extend to a number of carbon-intensive products as discussed below.  In neither 
case would the U.S. carbon tax be rebated on exports.21 
B. Fossil Fuels 
Fossil fuels made up approximately 80 percent of U.S. emissions in 2006.  
Energy Information Administration (2007)  Most developed countries have a 
similar profile.  Developing countries will tend to have higher emissions from 
agricultural and deforestation, so considerations of how to include those activities 
in the tax base will be more important for developing countries.   
There are two principles, one physical and one economic, which allow us 
to substantially reduce the collection and enforcement costs for a tax on emissions 
from fossil fuels.  The first is that a unit of fossil fuel will emit the same amount 
of carbon regardless of when or where it is burned.  For carbon emissions from 
fossil fuel combustion, there is a perfect correspondence between input and 
output.  Therefore, we can tax the input – the fossil fuel – rather than the output – 
the emission.  (The exception to this rule is for fossil fuel permanently 
sequestered, such as fuel used for tar or carbon that is captured and stored.  This 
issue is discussed in section _ below.)   
The second principle is that the incidence of a tax (and its efficiency 
effects) is unrelated to the statutory obligation to remit the tax.  This means that 
we can impose the tax (choose the remitting entity) to minimize collection and 
monitoring costs and to ensure maximum coverage.  In general, imposing the tax 
upstream (i.e., at the earliest point in the production process) will achieve these 
goals as there are (1) far fewer upstream producers than there are downstream 
consumers and (2) because of economies of scale in tax administration, the cost 
will be lower per unit of tax.   
To illustrate, there are approximately 149 petroleum refineries in the U.S. 
but there are 247 million drivers as well as millions of users of other petroleum 
distillates.  Imposing the tax at the refinery level on petroleum products will be far 
less expensive than, say, trying to monitor emissions at the tailpipe.  Similar 
principles apply to other fossil fuels.  The key is to find a place between 
extraction and consumption where it is simple to tax all or almost all of a fuel. 
                                                 
21  Maintaining the origin basis principle, it is presumed that countries with carbon pricing systems 
in place would not tax imports from the US that already have a carbon tax embedded in their price. 
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Arguments for downstream imposition of the tax tend to be based on a 
claim that a downstream tax is more visible and, therefore will have a greater 
effect.  The claim would be that consumers’ response depends on visibility.22  It is 
doubtful that this effect could be very large in the case of a carbon tax for two 
reasons.  First, firms are likely to advertise the embedded tax in, say, gasoline, so 
that drivers would be aware that part of the cost of the gasoline is the tax.  
Second, key energy consumers – electric utilities and industrial energy users – are 
unlikely to be affected by this behavioral phenomenon.23 
1. Natural Gas 
Natural gas was responsible for 1,163 million metric tons of CO2 
emissions in the U.S. in 2006.   Energy Information Administration (2007) (p. 11, 
Table 4) (This is burned natural gas that produces CO2 as opposed to release of 
natural gas or methane into the atmosphere.)  It is used largely for heating in the 
industrial and residential sectors and to produce electric power.  Energy 
Information Administration (2006)  It is a very efficient fuel in the sense that it 
produces a large amount of energy for a given emission of CO2.   
Natural gas is produced in a variety of circumstances.  Most natural gas 
comes from stand alone gas wells but some is associated with oil production.24  
An additional source (about 9 percent of the U.S. total) comes from coal beds.  
There were almost 450,000 natural gas wells in the U.S. in 2006, and we would 
need to tax about 100,000 of them to get 90 percent coverage of U.S. production.   
                                                 
22 CHETTY, R., A. LOONEY, and K. KROFT (2007): "Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence," 
Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. and FINKELSTEIN, A. (2007): "E-Ztax: 
Tax Salience and Tax Rates," Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. present 
evidence that the saliency of a tax increases the elasticity of demand among consumers (Chetty et 
al) and among commuters on a toll road (Finkelstein).   
23 None of the existing carbon pricing schemes are imposed upstream.  Instead, they tend to be 
imposed midstream, on large industrial point sources of emissions, such as power plants and 
industrial users of fuel. For example, the EU emissions trading regime is imposed midstream.  The 
reason appears to be that countries in the EU wanted to exclude transportation from their system.  
An upstream tax would have a harder time excluding transportation, so the compromise was a 
more expensive downstream tax.  A related issue is the allocation of free permits.  If there are 
short-term price rigidities (such as through electricity price regulation, for example), it may matter 
which entities receive the free allocation.  Midstream allocation of the permits may allow 
politicians to buy off potentially blocking interests. 
24 For a summary of natural gas production data, see 
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/ng/ng_prod_sum_dcu_NUS_a.htm  
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Most natural gas, when extracted is “wet” and must be converted to “dry” 
gas before it is put into the pipeline system.  There are 530 large natural gas 
processors in the lower 48 states and these process a substantial majority of the 
natural gas used.25  Energy Information Administration (2006).  Some natural gas, 
however, is processed close to the point of extraction in smaller “skid” processors 
and some natural gas, mostly coal bed methane and some wells that produce dry 
gas, enters the pipeline system without substantial processing.   
Once processed, natural gas enters into the pipeline system and is 
delivered to the local distribution companies.  Virtually all gas goes through the 
pipeline system.  Not all gas goes to a local distribution company, however, as 
some large volume consumers buy directly from the transmission pipelines. 
We would propose that all sources of natural gas entering the pipeline 
network be made subject to the tax.  This would include all processors, the 55 
import points and the few producers that do not need to process gas before 
entering the pipeline.  This would include coal bed methane.  Most natural gas is 
processed and there are a relatively small number of processors, thereby ensuring 
substantial coverage at a minimal cost.  In addition, by taxing at the processor, we 
avoid the problem of different wells producing natural gas of differing carbon 
content (i.e., differing amounts of containments).  An alternative would be to tax 
the transmission pipelines but we would need to determine a method of avoiding 
duplication of the tax if natural gas is transmitted through more than one pipeline.   
Most natural gas used in the U.S. is produced here, but some is imported 
through pipelines from Canada and through liquefied natural gas facilities from 
other places.  There are right now only 55 locations where natural gas (or 
liquefied natural gas) can be imported or exported, consisting of five liquefied 
natural gas facilities and 50 pipelines.  Energy Information Administration (2007)  
These are all regulated by the FERC.  All of these facilities would need to be 
added to the tax base, bringing the total up to 585 taxpayers to cover virtually 100 
percent of natural gas emissions. 
2. Coal 
Coal can be taxed at the production level (mine and import) or at the 
consumption level (electric utiltiies and industry).  We recommend the former.  
There were 1,438 operating mines in the U.S. in 2006.  Energy Information 
                                                 
25 A modest amount of natural gas enters the pipeline network without processing.    ENERGY 
INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION (2006): "Natural Gas Processing: The Crucial Link between 
Natural Gas Production and Its Transportation to Market." p. 3.   
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Administration (2007)  Almost all coal used in the U.S. is produced here and there 
are very few exports.  Taxing at the mine would capture virtually 100 percent of 
U.S. coal production.  Moreover, as noted, coal mines are potential sources of 
methane, either captured and put into the pipeline system or released into the air.  
If it is captured, this source of methane may not need to be processed  Therefore, 
having mines as taxpayers may create synergy – they can pay the tax on this 
source of natural gas or methane as well.  If it is not captured, coal mines should 
pay a tax on any release.  Coal-bed methane emissions were around 58.5 million 
metric tons of CO2 equivalents, so imposing this tax will be important.  
An alternative is to tax coal downstream.  Almost 93 percent of coal is 
used in electricity generation and nearly all the rest is used by industry.  There are 
1,493 coal generated power plants in the U.S., so taxing the power plants would 
not be more difficult than taxing at the mine and would have only a slightly 
smaller base.  Taxing at the utility, however, would mean losing the synergy 
created by taxing at the mine discussed above.26  As there does not appear to be 
any advantage to taxing at the utility and some disadvantage, taxing at the mine 
seems to be preferable.27 
In the U.S., coal is sorted into four types: anthracite, bituminous, 
subbituminous, and lignite.  Each of these grades has a different carbon content 
and, therefore, would need to face a different tax rate.28  If the carbon content is 
within any one of the U.S. grades is relatively uniform, there would be little 
reason to consider a more fine-grained approach.  If, however, there is significant 
variation within a grade, finer gradations may be worth considering.  Existing cap 
and trade bills in Congress generally delegate this decision so the relevant agency, 
and a similar delegation would probably be sensible for a carbon tax. 
                                                 
26 It also increases the administrative burden for power plants that are dual-fired (burning coal and 
natural gas).  Plants burning coal would be required to file taxes while plants burning only gas 
would not.   
27 If a large percentage of utilities are in eventually the tax system because of credits for carbon 
capture and storage activities, there may be little difference in the number of taxpayers.  Mines 
will be taxpayers because of coal-bed methane and coal-burning utilities will be taxpayers because 
of CCS.  Moreover, unless CCS credits were refundable or tradable, having utilities being 
taxpayers may reduce problems with unusable credits.  On the other hand, CCS does not right now 
exist in the U.S. and it is not clear how long it will be before it is in widespread use.  Taxing 
utilities may also be more complex because some plants can use more than one type of fuel, so the 
tax would have to vary depending on the fuel being used.  In addition, taxing utilities would 
require industrial users of coal to be subject to tax separately, a step that is not necessary if the 
mines are taxed. 
28 Germany apparently uses eight grades, with the carbon content varying by grade.   
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3. Petroleum 
The two potential places to tax petroleum products are at the well (or at 
import) or at the refinery.  Taxing petroleum downstream is impractical – there 
are over two hundred million drivers plus many users of distillates other than 
gasoline.  There were only 149 operating refineries in the US in 2007, making the 
refineries a logical place to impose the tax.  Refineries could pay a separate tax on 
each distillate depending on the carbon content.  Distillates, such as tar, that will 
not be burned would not be subject to tax.  Imports of crude from countries with 
no carbon pricing system would be subject to the tax at the refinery without any 
special provision.  Imports of refined products (about 3.5 million barrels/day), 
however, would need to be taxed.29   
Refineries often engage in inventory exchanges with other refineries.  
Although normally, the sale of inventory would be the event that triggers the 
carbon tax, inventory exchanges should not be taxed because doing so would 
cascade the tax:  the inventory would be taxed when refinery 1 exchanges it with 
refinery 2 and once again when refinery 2 sells it into the market.   
4. Other issues with the taxation of fossil fuels 
We approached carbon emissions from fossil fuels by looking at each fuel.  
It is worth pausing to look at whether the structure of particular industries will 
affect how the tax works.  We examine here permanently sequestered carbon, 
regulated power, and transportation (road, air, and sea).   
The most important issue with respect to the regulated power industry is to 
ensure that the tax is part of the rate base so that it is passed on to customers.  If it 
is not, users will not see the appropriate price, defeating part of the reason for the 
tax.  (Investors would see the effect, potentially leading to beneficial diversion of 
investment into low carbon technology.)  This should not be an issue with a tax on 
the fuel purchased by the utility: if the tax is imposed upstream, it would simply 
be embedded in the price and naturally flow into the rate base.  This presumes that 
state regulators allow utilities to flow through fuel cost increases into higher 
prices.  It is not obvious that this will always occur.  Regulatory reluctance to 
flow permit costs through to higher prices will likely be higher for a cap and trade 
                                                 
29 An advantage of taxing at the refinery is that we would be setting rates for refined products that 
could then be used for taxing imports of refined products.   
Note that we need to ensure that any fuel used by refineries would be taxed under this system.  
That is, we have to ensure the tax on refined products is not only on the sale of refined products 
but also in the refinery’s own use of any petroleum. 
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system where permits are given away; there is an opportunity cost to using a 
permit, even if received for free but it is very unlikely that the opportunity cost 
would be in the rate base.30  Similar issues may arise with respect to tax credits 
intended to act similarly to freely allocated permits. 
The major issue with respect to road transportation is the interaction with 
existing tax and regulatory regimes.  There are gas taxes under current law as well 
as regulatory regimes, such as CAFE, designed to alter gasoline usage.  The 
question is whether the carbon tax goes on top of these regimes or replaces some 
or all of them.   
There are numerous externalities from driving, including (noncarbon) 
pollution, accidents, and congestion.  Parry, I. and K. A. Small (2005) find that 
the optimal gas tax is roughly twice as high as the current U.S. tax.  The major 
component of the tax is congestion externalities, and carbon emissions are a 
relatively small element.  Therefore, the imposition of a tax on petroleum and 
hence gasoline to internalize externalities from carbon emissions should not result 
in a reduction in the existing gasoline tax. 
The appropriate treatment of aviation and other bunker fuels is part of the 
larger issue of carbon leakage and optimal border tax treatment.  We discuss this 
in greater detail below.  But we make some preliminary comments here.  Taxing 
emissions from aviation on purely domestic flights would be straightforward – jet 
fuel would be taxed at the refinery.  There are, however, two problems with 
taxing emissions from international aviation.  The first is that there is an existing 
treaty under the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) that prohibits 
imposing taxes on fuel carried on international services.  Second, because of the 
possibility of fueling or refueling in countries without a tax, leakage could be a 
significant problem.  Moreover, if we cannot know when fuel is taxed at the 
refinery whether it will be used for international or domestic flights, taxing fuel at 
the refinery may not be feasible.   
There are several options.  First, we could impose a tax on international 
aviation by making several adjustments.  The ICAO treaty could be renegotiated 
(or we could simply breach it).  In addition, to prevent leakage, we could impose a 
surcharge for any fuel taken on in a non-taxing country for flights whose 
                                                 
30 MATHUR, A., K. A. HASSETT, and G. E. METCALF (2008): "The Consumer Burden of a Cap-and-
Trade System with Freely Allocated Permits." discuss the distributional implications of different 
regulatory treatment of freely allocated versus auctioned permits. 
 
 Metcalf/Weisbach The Design of a Carbon Tax              Page 30 
 
 
destination is within the United States.  The second alternative is to forgo taxing 
fuel used in international aviation.  Airlines would get a credit for fuel used in 
international flights much like the crediting system for CCS.  The problem with 
this alternative is that it would leave out a significant source of emissions – 
globally international aviation emissions are about twice as great as domestic 
aviation emissions.  Stern, N. (2007) p. 549.   
The economic issues are similar for bunker fuels in shipping.  While there 
is no treaty preventing the taxation of bunker fuels, the problem of leakage is 
serious – ships would have incentives to refuel in locations where there is no tax.  
Moreover, it might be more difficult to track fuel use on ships that on aircraft, 
making it more difficult to impose a surcharge for such refueling.   
C. Other sources of emissions 
 In addition to fossil fuel combustion, greenhouse gas emissions arise from 
1) non-combustion CO2 emissions; 2) non-CO2 greenhouse gas emissions, 
including agriculture; and 3) forestry and land use activities.  We discuss below 
the extent to which these sources should be included in the tax base.  The EPA 
data on marginal abatement costs allows us to estimate the benefits of including 
various sources in the tax base, but there is no data on the administrative costs of 
doing so.  Therefore, the judgments below are necessarily preliminary and greater 
study of most of these sources of emissions is warranted. 
1. Non-Combustion CO2 emissions 
 Non-combustion carbon dioxide emissions account for less than 4 percent 
of CO2 emissions in 2006.  Cement manufacturing and steel and iron production 
account for nearly half the emissions in this category.  It may be reasonable to 
include their emissions (as well as emissions from a few other industries in this 
category) in the tax base. 
Cement manufacturing produces about 46 million metric tons of CO2 per 
year separate from the energy used during production.  The emissions stem from 
the production of clinker, an intermediate product, which is a combination of lime 
and silica-containing materials.  According to the U. S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (2008), the quantity of CO2 emitted during production is directly 
proportional to the lime content of the clinker (p. 4-5).  The tax would be imposed 
at the source of clinker production.  There are 118 cement plants in the United 
States owned by 39 companies.  These are large, stationary sources of emissions 
and, therefore, should be relatively easy to tax.   
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  Steel and iron production produced 49.1 MMT of CO2 in 2006 and 0.9 
MMT of CO2e of methane.  The emissions, separate from emissions associated 
with the energy used to produce iron and steel, come from the production of 
metallurgical coke, pig iron, and steel itself.   The emissions can be measured 
indirectly by the amount of coke, pig iron, and steel production.  The tax can be 
applied at the point of production.  There are only 23 steel mills in the U.S.  
Therefore, like cement manufacturing, steel and iron production should be 
relatively easy to include in the tax base.   
2. Other Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
 In addition to carbon dioxide, a number of other gases contribute to global 
warming.  Gases other than carbon dioxide account for 15 percent of total U.S. 
emissions with methane being the most important., followed by nitrous oxide.  
Fluorinated gases and sulfur hexafluoride are modest contributors but have very 
high global warming potential.  Sulfur hexaflouride, for example, has a 100 year 
global warming potential of 23,900.  Using this conversion, a $25 per ton CO2e 
carbon tax would be equal to $597,500 per ton SF6.  Therefore, even a modest 
carbon tax may have a large effect on the use of these chemicals.  While non-CO2 
emissions are not a large share of total emissions, studies suggest that they will 
provide a relatively low-cost source of emission reductions under a carbon tax or 
other form of carbon pricing.  Paltsev, S., J. M. Reilly, H. D. Jacoby, A. C. 
Gurgel, G. E. Metcalf, A. P. Sokolov and J. F. Holak (forthcoming), for example, 
estimate that nearly half the initial emission reductions from carbon pricing would 
come from reductions in non-CO2 emissions. 
 Two-thirds of all methane emissions come from three sources: enteric 
fermentation (126.2 million metric tons of CO2e), landfills (125.7) and natural gas 
systems (102.4).  Coal mining and manure management add about another 100 
million metric tons.   
Enteric fermentation comes primarily from the digestive process in 
ruminants, in the U.S., largely cattle, which produces methane.  The feed quality 
and feed intake affect emissions.  The U.S. inventory system measures emissions 
from enteric fermentation through detailed calculations that separate cattle by 
region, age, sub-type (dairy cows, beef cows, dairy replacements, beef 
replacements, steer stockers, heifer stockers, steer feedlot animals, and heifer 
feedlot animals), and production (e.g., pregnant, lactating).  They use estimates of 
the digestible energy from various diets to determine emissions from the various 
categories.    
The EPA estimates the marginal abatement costs for methane from enteric 
fermentation.  For the United States, it estimates that emissions in 2010 could be 
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reduced by 6.4% at zero cost and 21.4% at $45/ton.  (EPA 2006 V-49, Table 1-
18)  These are reasonably large reductions for the cost.  As a result, we might 
consider levying a head tax on cattle based on average emissions for a small 
number of cattle types.  Since modifications to diet can reduce emissions, tax 
payers should be allowed a reduced rate when proof is provided of the use of 
approved diets that reduce emissions.     
According to the EPA Inventory, roughly 1,800 operating landfills exist in 
the United States.  Municipal landfills account for nearly 90 percent of methane 
landfill emissions with industrial landfills making up the rest.  Methane recovery 
has grown over time since 1990 federal regulations required large landfills to 
capture and combust landfill methane (thereby converting it to less potent CO2).  
Whereas only 20 percent of landfill methane was burned for gas, flared, or 
oxidized in 1990, over half of the methane emissions were in 2006 (Table 8-3).  
The EPA estimates that with a $45/ton tax, more than 80% of U.S. landfill 
emissions could be eliminated.  (EPA 2006, III-10, Table 1-6)  Requiring 
monitoring of all landfills and including their emissions in the tax base should be 
relatively straightforward. 
 Methane emissions from natural gas systems arise in field production 
(27%), processing (12%), transmission and storage (37%) and distribution 
(24%).31  So-called “directed inspection and maintenance” can significantly 
reduce these emissions.  (EPA 3006, II-16).  Implementing the carbon tax on 
processers will ensure that nearly three-quarters of these emissions are brought 
into the carbon tax base and thereby provide the appropriate incentives to 
producers to implement improvements to reduce accidental releases.  Scope 
appears available for improvement.  Despite the growth in natural gas 
consumption between 1990 and 2006, emissions in the processing, transmission 
and storage, and distribution stages fell by nearly twenty percent. 
 Bringing emissions in the field into the tax system is probably not 
realistic.  Instead, mandates for certain processes or technologies may be useful 
here.  The rising price of natural gas over time will also provide an incentive to 
reduce emissions (as they reflect natural gas that cannot be sold). 
 Methane emissions from other sources can be considered for inclusion in 
the tax base on a case-by-case basis.  Emissions from coal mines, are easily 
monitored and collected in some but not all cases.  Nearly two-thirds of these 
emissions come from underground mines (Table 3-26, EPA (2008)) where 
                                                 
31 Shares of emissions from U. S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (2008): "Inventory of 
U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990-2006." 
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methane is removed through ventilation systems for safety reasons and so can be 
collected, measured, and made subject to the tax.32  Emissions from surface 
mines, on the other hand, are more difficult to capture as they are released as the 
overburden is removed.  These emissions are much lower in amount, however.  
(EPA 2006, II-2-3).  The EPA estimates that almost 86% of methane emissions 
from coal mining can be eliminated at $15/ton, making coal-bed methane a good 
target for inclusion in the tax base.  (EPA 2006 II-10, Table 1-8) 
 Nitrous oxide has a high global warming potential.  Nearly three-quarters 
of the 368 million metric tons CO2e of emissions come from agricultural 
management activities.  These emissions are a prime example of a case where 
there are large emissions (almost 4% of the US total) but where it will be difficult 
to include them in the tax base.  The reason is that the emissions stem from a wide 
variety of hard to observe sources.  The particular extent of emissions depends on 
the precise nature and location of the activity, making it difficult to set tax rates.  
A full exploration of emissions from agricultural soil management would need a 
separate study.  We make only a few initial observations here. 
Nitrous oxide is produced naturally in soils through nitrification and 
denitrification.  Various agricultural activities increase mineral nitrogen 
availability in soils, increasing the amount of nitrous oxide emitted.  These 
include application of synthetic nitrogen fertilizers, organic amendments to soil 
(such as manure, compost, and sludge), urine and dung from grazing animals, and 
crop residues.33  Various soil management activities, such as irrigation, drainage, 
tillage, and fallowing of land influences nitrogen mineralization.  See U. S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (2008).   
The precise emissions from any given activity depend on many factors.  
For example, the granularity of the soil affects the process of denitrification.  
Environmental Protection Agency (2007) p 6-16. This means that the tax rate can 
only be correct on average.  Actual emissions from any particular activity cannot 
be measured.  Instead a tax will have to rely on rough proxies, such as the total 
amount of fertilizer applied, or the total number of livestock grazing during the 
                                                 
32  Prior to 2002, coalbed methane was eligible for the section 29 non-conventional fuels tax credit 
of $3 per barrel of oil equivalent (see CARLSON, C., and G. E. METCALF (2008): "Energy Tax 
Incentives and the Alternative Minimum Tax," National Tax Journal, 61, 477-491.).  The credit 
could be reinstated or methane flaring could be allowed as an offset activity to provide a financial 
incentive to capture these emissions. 
33 Figure 6-2 in U. S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (2008): "Inventory of U.S. 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990-2006." provides a picture of agricultural sources of 
nitrogen that result in N2O emissions. 
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year.  It is worth noting, however that EPA (2008) estimates that roughly twenty 
percent of N2O emissions arise from the use of artificial fertilizers.  A fertilizer 
tax would likely lead to less fertilizer use but could lead to other practices that in 
turn release nitrogen.  For example, if fertilizer is taxed but manure is not, there 
would be incentives to substitute toward manure (thereby making livestock 
relatively less expensive as an output would become more valuable and, therefore, 
possibly increasing emissions from livestock). 
The second largest source of nitrous oxide is mobile combustion emissions 
(33.1 million metric tons).  Mandating annual vehicle emissions tests would 
provide a way to include these in the tax base.34  The remaining nitrous oxide 
emissions can be added to the tax base on a case by case basis. 
There are a large number of manmade gases (generically, fluorinated 
gases) used throughout the economy with high global warming potentials.35  
Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and related chemicals were in wide use prior to the 
Montreal Protocol but were banned because of their effect on ozone.  
Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) were developed as alternatives to these ozone-
depleting substances for industrial, commercial, and consumer products.  The 
global warming potentials of these gases range from around 140 (HFC-152a) to 
11,700 (HFC-23).36  They have varying atmospheric lives, with some very short 
and some ranging up to tens of thousands of years.  If treated as a single category, 
they make up about 123 million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent 
emissions in the US each year.  This would make them one of the top five sources 
of emissions.   
Because they have a very high global warming potential, the tax on these 
chemicals will be many times the market price.  The price signal from taxation, 
therefore, may be very important for these chemicals.  Nevertheless, they may not 
                                                 
34  Annual emissions are the product of emissions per gallon gasoline, miles per gallon, and miles 
driven.  The first and third components of this can be measured at the inspection (assuming 
mileage records are kept as part of the inspection).   Assumptions about fuel efficiency can be built 
into the tax based on year and model of the vehicle. 
35 Information for this section of the paper comes from INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE (2005): "Safeguarding the Ozone Layer and the Global Climate System: Issues Related 
to Hydrofluorocarbons and Perfluorocarbons," Cambridge University Press.. 
36 The global warming potential of these gases is very sensitive to the period of measurement as 
they have a wide range of atmospheric lifetimes.  See table TS.2, p. 33-34 in — (2007): "Climate 
Change 2007 -- the Physical Science Basis, Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth 
Assessment Report of the IPCC," Cambridge University Press. for a completely list of these 
chemicals and their global warming potentials over various periods. 
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be easy to tax through a direct mechanism.  The reason is that emissions from 
fluorinated gases are largely fugitive emissions, gases that inadvertently escape 
through leakage or inappropriate disposal.  For example, a significant source of 
HFC’s is leakage from air conditioning for cars and trucks.  Similarly, certain 
types of foam contain significant HFC’s and improper disposal can lead to the 
eventual release of the gases.  This means that there is no observable transaction 
on which to base the tax.   
A promising method of taxing emissions of these gases is a deposit-refund 
system.  In a deposit refund system, an initial presumptive tax on the manufacture 
or purchase of an item is levied and a refund provided upon proof of proper 
disposal.  To illustrate, consider an automobile with an air conditioner that uses 
HFCs.  Imagine that it uses an amount that if emitted to the atmosphere would 
trigger a tax of $1,000.  Any HFCs that have not leaked out of the car can be 
recovered upon scrapping of the car and reused thereby avoiding any release to 
the atmosphere.  Rather than try to tax the leakage, we can impose a tax of $1,000 
per unit when purchased and a refund of the tax for all HFCs that are recycled 
upon retirement of the automobile.  Even though disposition of the automobile 
may not be easily monitored, an incentive exists to capture and recycle the HFCs.  
The tax is then paid only on the HFCs that have leaked out of the car over its 
lifetime.37   
A deposit refund system potentially works in the fluorinated gas context 
because there are a relatively few manufacturers, making collection of the upfront 
tax easy.  For example, there are only five producers of HFC’s in the U.S. right 
now.  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2005)  In addition, in many 
places, there are well-developed recycling, reuse, or disposal requirements for 
these chemicals, which means that tracking disposal would not be expensive.  In 
addition, given the refund upon proper disposal, there would be an incentive to 
reveal information about disposal to be eligible for refunds.  For example, HFC’s 
are currently used in vehicle air conditioning systems.  When a vehicle is junked, 
there would be an incentive to remove the system with the HFC’s intact to obtain 
the refund. 
A deposit refund system faces many of the same design issues as does a 
tax.  For example imports would have to be carefully monitored and taxed.  If the 
gases can be imported without tax, businesses could earn profits by manufacturing 
                                                 
37 Deposit-refund systems are discussed extensively FULLERTON, D., and A. WOLVERTON (2005): 
"The Two-Part Instrument in a Second-Best World," Journal of Public Economics, 89, 1961-
1975..   It might be necessary to create tightness quality standards for automobile air conditioners 
since it is difficult for the consumer to monitor the quality of the air conditioner.    
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the chemicals abroad for the sole reason of obtaining the refund in the U.S.  Since 
most of the HFCs are used in refrigeration and air conditioners, it is likely that 
imposing a tax on import should not be overly difficult. 
 In a related vein, some of these gases are used in the production of other 
goods, such as the use of perfluorocarbons in semiconductor manufacturing.  
Unless imports of goods manufactured with these chemicals are subject to tax, 
taxing domestic production would create an incentive to shift production abroad, 
particularly because the tax would be many times the cost of the chemical (due to 
the high global warming potential).  Moreover, an accurate tax on imports might 
be difficult to assess because the tax should be on the emission of these gases and 
emissions from manufacturing abroad would not be observable.  Therefore, 
depending on how easy it is to shift manufacturing using these gases abroad, a 
lower tax rate may be appropriate.  This is simply another example of the border 
tax problem that we discuss below. 
 A major source of emissions of fluorinated gases comes from existing 
banks of these gases rather than new production.  According to the IPCC, there 
are almost 21 million metric tons of CO2 equivalents in banked fluorinated gases.  
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2005)  For example, because of the 
Montreal Protocol, production of CFC’s has ceased in the developed world.  
Nevertheless, emissions from CFC’s continue because they remaining in existing 
refrigeration and other systems.  Banked gases will not have been subject to the 
tax on production, so the question is whether they should be subject to the refund 
on proper disposal.  Our view is that they should:  the refund on proper disposal 
creates an incentive not to emit these gases.  Given the size of existing banks, 
proper disposal is important.  This is analogous to an offset provision for 
greenhouse gas emissions that are not included in the tax base. 
 Finally sulfur hexaflouride is a potent greenhouse gas.  It is used on 
electrical transmission and distribution equipment with most emissions arising 
from leakage.  Emissions of SF6 fell by fifty percent between 1990 and 2006 
(EPA (2008)) reflecting the higher price of the product.  A deposit-refund 
mechanism here would be a relatively simple way to bring this gas into the carbon 
tax base. 
3. Forestry and Land Use Activities 
 Forestry and land use serves as a net sink, removing some 900 million 
metric tons of CO2e in 2006 from the atmosphere.  Changes in land and forest use 
can add or remove carbon on balance.  Adding these activities to the tax base 
would require establishing a base line.  To see the complexity of this, consider a 
forest that currently sequesters 100 tons of carbon dioxide per year.  Should an 
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owner of that property receive a tax credit for the 100 tons of sequestered CO2?  
Or perhaps the owner should be subjected to a tax on 50 tons of CO2 because an 
"undisturbed" forest would sequester 150 tons of CO2.   One way to proceed 
would be to set as a baseline emissions/sequestration as of the first year of the 
carbon tax.  If the tax is anticipated, this creates an incentive to cut down the 
forest prior to the first year of the tax so as to obtain large amounts of credits in 
early years (young forests absorb more carbon than do mature forests).   
 Once a baseline is set, a forestry carbon assessment could be undertaken 
periodically (say every ten years) and the tax applied retrospectively.  Continuing 
with the example above, assume the forest in question is an immature forest and 
over a ten year period sequestration falls to 80.  With 100 established as the 
baseline, the annual emissions would be estimated to rise from zero to 20 by year 
ten.  The retrospective tax would be equal to 2 tons in year 1 times the tax rate in 
that year plus 4 tons in year 2 times the tax rate in that year and so on to year 10 
when the tax rate is 20 times the tax rate in that year.  Landowners could be 
required to make estimated payments over the decade in anticipation of the 
retrospective liability.  See Reilly, J. M. and M. O. Asadoorian (2007) and 
Metcalf, G. E. and J. M. Reilly (2008) for further discussion of this point. 
 One can imagine any number of complications with such a system.  It may 
be preferable to leave forestry and land use out of the tax system but provide the 
opportunity for them to opt in through offsets.  This might be limited to major 
land owners to limit administrative costs.  Considering forest ownership, we 
might limit offsets to the major paper and forest product companies and require 
that they consider offsets on their entire stock of land rather than individual 
parcels.  This reduces problems of non-additional projects (projects that lead to 
local reductions in greenhouse gas emissions but not to global reductions). 
4. Summary 
 We offered a brief survey of non-fossil fuel combustion emissions.  
Determining the full extent of the tax base for these emissions would require a 
more detailed examination of each item.  Based on the analysis above, however, it 
seems likely that we could include somewhere around half of the emissions from 
sources other than fossil fuel combustion at a reasonable cost.   
IV. Carbon Sequestration Credits 
 We have noted above in several places the need to provide credits for 
activities that permanently sequester carbon.  Carbon capture and storage, for 
example, is a much discussed technology to capture CO2 emissions from coal 
combustion in electricity generators.  The CO2 is compressed, liquefied, and 
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transported to a  geologically desirable location where it is permanently stored 
underground.  The technology for CCS is well understood and CO2 is injected 
underground now as part of enhanced oil recovery (EOR) methods.  StatoilHydro 
has a CCS program in place at its Sleipner natural gas field.  It captures one 
million metric tons of CO2 annually and stores it 800 meters below the seabed.  
Gas from the Snovhit field is converted to liquefied natural gas and the CO2 
frozen and removed.  The CO2 is transported back to the field and stored in a 
porous sandstone structure below the gas field.  A third CCS project in the Saleh 
gas field in Algeria currently captures and reinjects roughly 700,000 metric tons 
of CO2 into the gas field.38  The Weyburn-Midale fields in Saskatchewan, Canada 
are oil fields where CO2 is used for EOR on a large-scale.  The CO2 is purchased 
from the Dakota Gasification Company synfuels plant in North Dakota and 
shipped by pipeline to the Canadian fields.  It currently sequesters nearly 9000 
metric tons of CO2 per day in the field making it the largest sequestration project 
in operation today.39 
 While it is clear that CCS works in single applications, little is known 
about the potential to scale this up to levels that will be required given our current 
or projected coal consumption.  It is noteworthy that none of the existing projects 
are associated with coal production.  Deutch, J. and E. Moniz (2007) address the 
obstacles that the United States faces in developing a major CCS program for 
coal.  They estimate that a price in the neighborhood of $30 per ton CO2 begins to 
make CCS economically viable.  This assumes the various technical, regulatory, 
and political obstacles can be overcome. 
 Regardless of the feasibility of CCS, the carbon tax will only provide an 
incentive for sequestration if the tax base excludes fossil fuel use for which 
emissions are captured and stored.  This can be done either by explicitly 
excluding such fuels (and other gases for which sequestration occurs) from the tax 
base or by levying the tax and providing a credit for approved sequestration 
activities.   We advocate the latter as being easier to administer.  Credits could be 
applied against carbon tax liability.  Because firms engaging in CCS and other 
approved sequestration activities may not be the same firms that pay the carbon 
tax, we recommend that the credits be made tradable as is effectively done with 
other tax credits such as the low income housing tax credit.   Making the credits 
                                                 
38 Information about these projects comes from StatoilHydro's website at 
http://www.statoilhydro.com/en/EnvironmentSociety/Sustainability/2007/Environment/Climate/C
arbonCapture/Pages/CarbonCaptureAndStorage.aspx, accessed on May 31, 2008. 
39  Information taken from http://www.ptrc.ca/weyburn_overview.php accessed on May 31, 2008. 
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tradable ensures that their full value is realized by firms engaging in sequestration 
activities.40 
 Tax credits are also an issue for fossil fuels that are used as feedstocks, 
asphalt, lubricants, waxes, and other uses.  Table X breaks down emissions for 
these uses as well as carbon storage. 
2006 Carbon Dioxide Emissions and Storage from Non-Energy Fuel Use 
 
Source Emissions Stored Percentage Stored 
Feedstocks 83.0 132.4 62% 
Asphalt 0.0 92.8 100% 
Lubricants 19.1 1.8 9% 
Waxes 0.8 1.1 58% 
Other 35.2 11.4 24% 
Total 138.0 239.4 63% 
Source: Tables 3-14 and 3-15 in U. S. Environmental Protection Agency (2008). 
 
 Emissions from non-energy use accounted for 2 percent of total emissions 
in 2006.  Feedstocks are the main source of these emissions.  An upstream carbon 
tax will incorporate these emission sources in the tax base.  The more salient issue 
for non-energy fuel use is to ensure that we only tax emissions and not the carbon 
that is captured and permanently sequestered.  As Table X above indicates, the 
percentage of carbon stored ranges from very little (lubricants) to all (asphalt).  A 
simple tax credit works well where 100 percent of carbon is captured (as is the 
case with carbon capture and storage or the use of fuels in asphalt).  For 
intermediate fuels used as feedstocks, the 2008 EPA greenhouse gas report 
assumes that 62 percent of all carbon is stored regardless of the feedstock source.  
Thus one approach would allow a credit for fuels sold as feedstocks to receive a 
partial credit (62 percent of a CO22e ton per credit) with periodic updating of the 
storage factor as needed.  For the other category in Table X above, storage factors 
range from 10 percent for industrial coking coal to 50 percent for petroleum coke 
and distillate fuel oil.  It may be that providing a credit for asphalt and feedstock 
use is sufficient given the small amounts of stored carbon in the other categories.   
 Credits can be combined with offsets for non-covered activities.  As noted 
above, we see a role for qualified offsets that pass the additionality test (they are 
                                                 
40   The final incidence of the credits will depend on the relative supply and demand elasticities for 
these credits.  We anticipate that the demand elasticity would be significantly greater than the 
supply elasticity so that most of the value of credits will go to firms engaging in approved 
sequestration activities. 
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activities that lead to a net reduction in emissions and would not have taken place 
in the absence of the offset funds).  The difficulty of course is in assessing 
additionality.  Offsets would be provided to entities that demonstrate to the 
government's satisfaction that their non-tax base activities are reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions.  The offsets could be traded like the tax credits and 
used to reduce the carbon tax liability.  An open question is whether offsets 
should be limited to activities within the United States or available for activities 
undertaken elsewhere.  For example, offsets might be allowed for projects that 
satisfy CDM criteria.41  The experience with CDMs is instructive here.  Progress 
has been very slow in certifying and accepting CDM projects.  This occurs on a 
case-by-case basis.  Some have argued for sector-based CDM eligibility.   All the 
issues that arise with assessing CDM projects would also arise with domestic 
offset programs. 
V. Trade 
Because carbon emissions are a global externality – emissions anywhere 
affect everyone – and because of the large volume of trade in fossil fuels and in 
goods produced with fossil fuels, carbon taxes must always be designed with 
international considerations in mind.  In an ideal, and imaginary, world, all 
countries would impose a harmonized carbon tax so that emissions anywhere in 
the world faced the same price.  Realistically, some major emitting countries 
either will refuse to impose any price on carbon at all or do so in a narrow or 
perfunctory way.  Even countries that impose carbon pricing regimes may not 
harmonize their regimes creating problems when goods subject to different tax 
rates are traded.   
There are good arguments that a border tax is not inconsistent with, and in 
fact is required by, the principles of free trade.  Free trade relies on the principle 
of comparative advantage.  In a free market, everyone is better off if those who 
can produce a good at lowest cost do so.  A country without a carbon price does 
not have a true comparative advantage in producing carbon-intensive goods 
compared to a country with a carbon price; it produces at what looks like a lower 
cost only because the nominal price of the good does not include the full costs of 
production.   
The key problem with border tax adjustments for carbon is determining 
the carbon content of goods that are exported or imported.  Unlike border tax 
                                                 
41  Of course, projects that are used as offsets under a U.S. carbon tax should not be allowed as 
offsets under the EU Emissions Trading Scheme. 
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adjustments under a VAT, which are based on the price of the good, the carbon 
content of a good is not readily observable.   
So long as the two trading countries both have a carbon price, however, 
border tax adjustments are not necessary.  If both trading partners have carbon 
prices, neither would gain an advantage in trade with the other.  Therefore, we can 
substantially reduce administrative costs by using an origin basis system (i.e., no 
border tax adjustments) for trade between countries with an adequate carbon 
price.  Imports from countries without an adequate carbon price would, however, 
most likely need to be subject to a tax at the border as a substitute for their lack of 
a carbon price, and below we discuss ways to administer such a system.  Exports 
to these countries could either be allowed a rebate for carbon taxes here or not; 
there may be modest efficiency advantages to allowing a rebate but the 
administrative costs might be substantial. 
Although a complete discussion of the issues applicable to border tax 
adjustments for carbon taxes requires a separate paper, we provide a short 
discussion of the issues here.  
A. Trade in Carbon-Intensive Goods 
Before discussing the economic and legal issues related to border tax 
adjustments, it is worth having a sense of the extent of trade in carbon-intensive 
goods and the sources of imports.  To start, the six most energy-intensive U.S. 
manufacturing industries are petroleum refining, paper, mineral products (such as 
lime and cement), chemicals, ferrous metals (iron and steel), and nonferrous 
metals (largely aluminum).  Energy Information Administration (2002).  Border 
tax adjustments for imports of crude oil for petroleum refining should be 
relatively uncontroversial, so the major issues relate to the remaining five 
industries.42 
These products vary in their exposure to trade.  We import more than 40 
percent of our aluminum and copper, but only 13-15 percent of our paper.  
Surprisingly, the United States imports 25 percent of the cement it consumes 
notwithstanding its weight.  Houser, T., R. Bradley, B. Childs, J. Werksman and 
R. Heilmayr (2008).  The most energy-intensive goods tend to be less exposed to 
trade than non-energy intensive goods.  To illustrate this relationship, we 
reproduce below a table from Houser, T., R. Bradley, B. Childs, J. Werksman and 
R. Heilmayr (2008) that charts energy intensiveness relative to share of imports.  
                                                 
42 We focus here on energy intensive goods.  Note, however, that there may be goods that have 
high associated emissions because they are produced using high global warming potential gases. 
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The size of the bubbles represents emissions (which can vary with energy 
intensity based on the source of energy): 
 
Although trade discussions often explicitly or implicitly focus on China 
because of its increasing share of imports into the United States, China is a 
relatively small exporter of carbon-intensive goods.  Canada is instead the 
dominant exporter of such goods to the U.S.  Below we reproduce data from 
Houser, T., R. Bradley, B. Childs, J. Werksman and R. Heilmayr (2008) on 
imports by origin for steel, aluminum, chemicals, paper, and cement.  As can be 
seen, China is significant only with respect to cement and Canada dominates all 
categories except for chemical imports, where it is second. 
U.S. Imports by Origin, 2005 
 Steel Aluminum Chemicals Paper Cement 
 Source % Source % Source % Source % Source % 
1 Canada 18.6 Canada 51.0 Trinidad 41.6 Canada 66.9 Canada 16.1 
2 EU 17.3 Russia 17.1 Canada 19.3 EU 16.8 China 14.0 
3 Mexico 13.1 EU 6.2 Ukraine 7.3 China 3.5 EU 13.9 
4 Brazil 8.2 OPEC 5.1 OPEC 6.6 S. Korea 2.2 OPEC 10.0 
5 China 7.1 Brazil 3.8 EU 4.5 Mexico 2.2 Thailand 8.6 
Source:  Houser et al. (2008) 
 
 It is worth making several comments on this table. First, it does not 
include finished products such as automobiles.  These products may be very 
carbon intensive and their sources may be different than the sources listed above.  
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Second, the manufacture of many of these items has been shifting toward 
developing nations, so the 2005 data presented by not reflect long term trends.  
Finally, as discussed below, even a large majority of our imports of carbon 
intensive goods comes from developed countries that are likely to enact or have 
already enacted carbon pricing regimes, border tax adjustments can still be 
important because they will have net revenue effects (unlike in the typical case of 
border tax adjustments under a VAT).  We discuss this latter point below. 
B. The Effect of Border Tax Adjustments 
1. The effect of border tax adjustments for a specific excise tax. 
Border tax adjustments provide a rebate for any taxes paid when a good is 
exported and impose a tax when a good is imported.  They are standard in VAT’s 
around the world.  VAT’s with border tax adjustments are known as destination-
basis VAT’s.  A VAT without border tax adjustments is known as an origin-basis 
VAT.  Virtually all VATs are destination basis. 
As is well-known, border tax adjustments under a broad-based VAT have 
no net present value effect.  The reason is that the present value of exports has to 
be equal to the present value of imports.  Therefore, the present value of the 
rebate on exports has to equal the present value of the tax on imports.43  There are 
timing differences in the flow of revenues to the government – imports and 
exports with the same present value can happen at different times – but the long-
term effect has a net present value of zero. 
Because origin and destination-based systems have the same net effect, it 
does not matter which system is used, apart from tax administrative cost and 
compliance issues.  Moreover, it does not matter whether countries imposing a 
VAT harmonize with one another with respect to border tax adjustments (again, 
apart from administrative or compliance issues).   
These results do not hold for a specific excise tax like a carbon tax.  We 
consider four effects.  First, border tax adjustments will have present value 
revenue effects.  The reason is that the present value of imports and exports of 
embedded carbon may not be the same.  Carbon intensive products can be 
imported in exchange, say, for services or exported for non-carbon intensive 
goods.  The taxes or rebates on carbon products will not be offset by the taxes or 
rebate on the services or non-carbon intensive goods.  For trade between two 
countries with harmonized carbon taxes, the main effect of border tax adjustments 
                                                 
43 The key assumption is that the VAT covers all exports and imports. 
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is the revenue: a destination-basis system (one with border taxes) gives the 
revenue to the country where consumption takes place while an origin basis 
system (one without border taxes) gives the revenue to the country where 
production takes place. 
Second, border tax adjustments and the location of tax remittance interact.  
Once we are in a world with cross-border trade in taxed products, it is no longer 
true that the location of tax remittance matters only with respect to administrative 
and compliance costs.  Instead, countries that import carbon-intensive goods 
benefit with a destination-based system while countries that export carbon-
intensive goods benefit with an origin-based system. 
To illustrate, suppose that a carbon-intensive good, say petroleum, is 
produced in three stages:  extraction, refining, and consumption.  Suppose also, as 
is often the case, that extraction takes place in a different country than refining 
and consumption.  In particular, suppose that C1 extracts oil and sells it to C2 in 
exchange for untaxed items.  C2 then refines and consumes the oil.   
If C1 collects the tax at the wellhead and there are no border adjustments, 
C1 keeps the revenue and, depending on the incidence of the tax, some 
combination of individuals in C1 and C2 bear the tax.  If there are border tax 
adjustments in both countries, C1 would rebate the taxes when the oil is exported 
and C2 would impose a tax when the oil is imported.  In effect, the border tax 
adjustment acts as an indirect transfer of the tax revenues from the extracting 
country to the consuming country.  If, on the other hand, the tax is collected at the 
refinery or on consumption, border tax adjustments have no effect because the tax 
is imposed in the same country as the consumption.  There is no occasion for 
border tax adjustments to operate. 
In general, if the good is produced in one country and consumed in 
another, it matters if the tax is remitted by the producer or the consumer of the 
good and whether there are border tax adjustments.  To foreshadow the discussion 
below, if we conclude that border tax adjustments for a carbon tax imposed 
upstream are illegal under current trade law but a carbon tax imposed directly on 
consumers would not be illegal (because there would be no border tax 
adjustments), we are effectively saying that the legal rules care about the technical 
issue of which entity is responsible for tax remittance rather than the economic 
effects of border tax adjustments.  This seems inappropriate. 
Third, when there is trade between two countries with carbon taxes, the 
system of border tax adjustments has to be harmonized.  Either both countries 
need to impose border tax adjustments or neither.  The reason is that without 
harmonization, products can either be subject to double taxation or no taxation, 
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depending on the direction of trade.  To illustrate, suppose that both C1 and C2 
have carbon taxes, and that C1 has no border tax adjustments and C2 has them.  If 
a product is produced in C1 and is subject to a carbon tax in C1 and then is 
exported to C2, there will be no rebate by C1 as there are no border tax 
adjustments.  C2, however will impose a tax at the border, resulting in a double 
tax on the product.  If a product is produced in C2 and exported to C1, however, 
there would be no tax because C1 would rebate the tax at the border and C2 would 
not impose a border tax adjustment.  Thus, harmonization is needed. 
Note that the same effect can occur in a world entirely without border tax 
adjustments but where countries do not harmonize on the location of tax 
collection.  For example, if C1 imposes a tax upstream on producers and C2 
imposes a tax downstream on consumers, we get exactly the same result, two 
taxes on the same emission, even if neither C1 nor C2 has border tax adjustments.  
Border tax adjustments eliminate this problem because they ensure that the 
consuming country ends up with the tax.  In this sense, we can view border tax 
adjustments as simply a mechanism for allowing the location of tax remittance to 
be determined on purely administrative cost grounds.  (As we will see, however, 
there is a trade-off because border tax adjustments themselves are complex.) 
Finally, and most centrally, border tax adjustments ensure that the terms of 
trade are consistent with the principle of comparative advantage where one 
trading partner has a carbon price and the other does not.  As noted above, if two 
countries produce a good at the same cost but one imposes a carbon tax on 
production and the other does not, it is not correct to say that the country without 
the tax has a comparative advantage and, therefore, is the efficient producer of the 
good.  The sole advantage of the non-taxing country is simply its willingness to 
impose an externality on the rest of the world.  This is not an advantage that the 
free trade laws should protect. 
Another way to say this is that the logic behind free trade relies on well-
functioning markets to allocate production of goods.  When there is a massive 
externality such as the emission of carbon, a Pigouvian tax on the externality is 
entirely consistent with free trade as the tax ensures that prices are correct.  
Border tax adjustments are necessary to impose a Pigouvian tax where there is an 
export from a non-taxing country. 
One of the arguments made against border tax adjustments for carbon 
taxes is a slippery slope argument:  if border tax adjustments are allowed in this 
case, they would be allowed for a wide variety of measures with protectionist 
intent or effect.  Any “trade plus” problem (trade plus labor, trade plus 
environment, etc.) can be recast as an externality.  For example, low-wage or 
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child labor in a trading partner can be thought of as creating externalities in the 
form of empathy for the workers.  A border tax would be necessary to internalize 
this harm.   Because almost anything can be cast as an externality, there appears 
to be no limits to this logic. 
Slippery slope arguments rely on an institutional inability to distinguish 
cases.  The argument is that if we take action x, we inevitably will take action y, 
and action y is undesirable.  This logic seems spurious in the context of climate 
change.  Legal and tax systems around the world regularly must decide which 
types of harms to recognize.  For example, tort systems must decide when an 
action by one party creates a compensable obligation.  Harms such as that 
expected from climate change – measurable and large harms – are easily 
distinguished from other types of harm. 
2. Border tax adjustments and renegade countries 
Carbon tax design and implementation will likely take place in a world 
where at least some major producing countries do not agree to impose a tax (or 
other carbon pricing regime) or do so only at minimal levels.  Thus, China or the 
United States, or some other major producing country, may not find it in its 
interest to impose a carbon pricing regime when other major countries do.  Border 
tax adjustments can play a central role in such a world.  There are two effects:  
preventing “leakage” and encouraging renegade countries to put a price on 
carbon. 
Leakage in the carbon pricing context refers to the shifting of production 
to countries that do not impose a price or otherwise regulate carbon.  A producer 
in a country with a carbon tax might move the location of production to a country 
without the tax and thereby avoid the tax.44   
                                                 
44 A second reason why carbon leakage will occur in these circumstances is that if the demand for 
energy goes down in the taxing countries because of the carbon tax, it will be cheaper for 
production in non-taxing countries to use energy intensive production processes.  If the U.S. 
reduces its demand for oil, China may simply increase its demand, offsetting the conservation 
efforts made in the U.S. 
The extent of carbon leakage is uncertain and is the subject of a number of studies.  Modeling the 
problem is complex because it requires modeling production location decisions.  Technological 
change also plays a role.  Thus, BABIKER, M. (2005): "Climate Change Policy, Market Structure, 
and Carbon Leakage," Journal of International Economics, 65, 421-445. argues that carbon 
leakage from the Kyoto Protocol may actually be substantially more than 100 percent – Kyoto 
would actually increase total carbon emissions.  DI MARIA, C., and E. VAN DER WEFT (2008): 
"Carbon Leakage Revisited: Unilateral Climate Policy with Directed Technical Change," 
Environmental and Resource Economics, 39., however, argue that induced technological change 
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With a border tax adjustment, the tax cannot be avoided by altering the 
location of production.  Suppose that production was originally taking place in C1 
and some consumption was taking place in each of C1 and C2.  If C1 imposes a 
carbon tax without border adjustments and C2 does not impose a carbon tax, 
shifting production to C2 avoids the tax entirely.  If C1 imposes border tax 
adjustments, there is no advantage to shifting the location of production.  
Consumption in C1 will be taxed and consumption in C2 will not be taxed 
regardless of where production takes place.  Thus, border tax adjustments reduce 
this form of leakage. 
 The second, closely related, reason for having border tax adjustments is to 
reduce the incentive for countries to be renegades.  The focus in this second 
argument is on the incentives on countries themselves as opposed to the 
incentives on industries.  Border tax adjustments reduce the benefit to renegade 
countries of remaining renegades because they would no longer be able to attract 
production through their lack of a carbon tax.45   
 A mixed regime of border tax adjustments for renegades and no 
adjustments (an origin-based system) for countries with harmonized taxes could 
be used to actually create an incentive for renegades to price carbon.  In 
particular, suppose that border tax adjustments were only applied to imports and 
exports from countries without a carbon pricing mechanism.  Goods from a 
country without carbon pricing exporting to a country with a carbon tax would 
face a border tax adjustment and the revenues would go to the consuming country.  
There would be no tax revenues and no advantage for the non-pricing country.  If 
the country prices carbon, however, it would get to keep the revenues – there 
would be no border adjustment – but not face any additional disadvantage with 
respect to trade.  (Its own citizens, of course, would now be subject to a tax on 
carbon consumption, but the tax could be made revenue neutral through 
reductions in other taxes.)   
                                                                                                                                     
may counterbalance the effect of carbon prices on the terms of trade.  The idea is that high carbon 
prices in countries that impose a tax or quota change the relative profitability of investing in clean 
technology.  There are numerous other studies of the issue.  Regardless of the extent of leakage, 
however, it is clear that any leakage is inefficient and that border tax adjustments prevent leakage 
through the location of production decisions.   
45 This border tax adjustment is slightly different than that discussed in VAT systems as we would 
not rebate the tax on exports to renegade countries. 
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C. Legal Issues with Border Tax Adjustments 
The legal status of border tax adjustments under a carbon tax is uncertain.  
The problem with their legality relates to the detailed rules under the GATT and 
WTO governing border tax adjustments in general and the scope of the so-called 
environmental exception.  A detailed discussion of the legal issues related to 
border tax adjustments for carbon taxes is well beyond the scope of this paper.46  
Briefly, a tax on import can only be imposed if there is an equivalent tax on like 
products in the home country.  There are two key phrases:  “likeness” and “on the 
product.” 
“Likeness” does not include how a product is produced.  Thus, a widget 
produced using coal as the source of energy and an identical widget produced 
using hydroelectric power are considered like products if the widgets themselves 
are alike.  If a product is produced in a foreign country using a different method 
than that used in the importing country, the importing country may not be able to 
impose a border tax based on the emissions created by the production of the good.   
Conceivably, the likeness restriction would not be fatal as we could 
impose a tax on imports equal to the tax imposed on domestic production of the 
good.  This would be imperfect – foreign producers with high emissions would 
face too low a tax and foreign products with low emissions too high a tax.  
Nevertheless, if the variance in emissions from production of the good is not too 
great, it may be a reasonable approach. 
The second phrase in the rule, however, may make this approach illegal.  
We cannot impose a border tax adjustment equivalent to the domestic tax unless 
the domestic tax is “on the product,” and it is unclear whether a carbon tax is a tax 
“on the product.”  A tax on profits from production of the product is not a tax on 
the product – it is a tax on profits.  Because the same product can face different 
taxes based on the production mechanism (and under the reasoning behind the 
“likeness” rule, production methods are not part of the product), the tax is 
arguably not on the product at all.  Therefore, even a tax on imports based on 
domestic emissions when the product is produced may not be legal. 
                                                 
46 For a discussion, see Goh, G. (2004). "The World Trade Organization, Kyoto and Energy Tax 
Adjustment at the Border." Journal of World Trade 38(3): 395-423, de Cendra, J. (2006). "Can 
Emissions Trading Schemes be Coupled with Border Tax Adjustments? An Analysis vis-a-vis 
WTO Law." Reciel 15(2): 131-145, Ismer, R. and K. Neuhoff (2007). "Border tax adjustment: a 
feasible way to support stringent emission trading." European Journal of Law and Economics 24: 
137-164. 
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Tax rebates on exports are covered under a different set of provisions 
governing illegal export subsidies.  Rebates are allowed for “prior stage 
cumulative taxes” borne by a like product when destined for local consumption.  
The definition of this phrase, prior stage cumulative taxes, is obscure but under 
existing interpretations, there are serious concerns that a carbon tax would not fit 
the definition.   
Finally, mixing origin and destination-based systems to create an incentive 
for renegade countries to impose a pricing regime would arguably fail the most 
favored nations rule, which is a fundamental tenet of trade law.  In particular, 
renegade nations subject to a border tax would argue that they are treated worse 
than other nations, contrary to the most favored nations clause principles.   
An entirely separate and possibly more promising legal approach is to 
claim that border tax adjustments are allowed under the so-called environmental 
exception to the normal GATT rules.  Under these rules, trade restrictions are 
allowed if needed to protect “human, animal, or plant life or health” or if they 
relate “to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources” and “such measures 
are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or 
consumption.”  Any such trade restriction under these rules must not be applied 
“in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a 
disguised restriction on international trade.” 
Interpretation of these various conditions has been controversial.  There 
have been many attempts to prevent trading partners from engaging in various 
practices viewed by the importing nation as inappropriate.  Thus, the U.S. 
attempted to impose rules to protect dolphins when tuna are harvested or and rules 
to product turtles were affected by shrimp farming.  Most of these restrictions 
have been struck down, although the U.S. turtle/shrimp rules were allowed.  The 
reasoning behind these cases is obscure – it is difficult to differentiate dolphin-
safe tuna and turtle-safe shrimp. 
It is difficult to see why the legal rules should be interpreted to prevent 
border tax adjustments.  As noted above, direct taxation of the consumer would 
have the same effect as taxation of production plus border tax adjustment, and 
there is no argument that direct taxation of consumers would be an illegal trade 
barrier.  Border tax adjustments are also consistent with, indeed mandated by, the 
principles behind free trade.  On the other hand, GATT rules are often formalistic, 
drawing distinctions that do not seem to make sense.  Border tax adjustments are 
allowed for indirect taxes like the VAT but not for economic equivalents, like 
wage taxes.   
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As noted above, a concern with border tax adjustments for carbon is the 
problem of slippery slopes.  Although carbon emissions are a very serious 
international problem, allowing taxes on imports under an environmental or 
human health argument would allow all kinds of less justified border taxes.  
Without a clear set of principles delineated when border taxes for externalities 
will be allowed, trade courts might be reluctant to allow any.  We do not think 
that this concern should prevent necessary border tax adjustments for a problem 
as serious as climate change. 
D. The Problem of Determining Carbon Content 
Beyond legal issues, a central problem with border tax adjustments is that 
it will be difficult to determine the carbon content of a good when it is imported.  
This problem is especially salient for so-called non-Annex I countries under the 
UNFCCC. These countries do not submit regular, detailed carbon inventories, 
making it difficult to determine the carbon content of their exports.  Moreover, 
these countries may not agree to impose a price on carbon.47    
One suggestion that has been made is that the border tax be imposed based 
on the carbon that that would have been emitted had the product been produced in 
the U.S.48  This proposal gets around the “likeness” problem with a tax on imports 
(although there remains the problem of whether a carbon tax is a tax on the 
product).  It also reduces the information problem both by using domestic 
information and by limiting the class of goods it applies to.   
The major problem with this tax is that it will often be very inaccurate 
because foreign production of a good often results in very different emissions that 
U.S. production.  To illustrate, we reproduce below a table from Houser, T., R. 
Bradley, B. Childs, J. Werksman and R. Heilmayr (2008) that estimates the 
carbon intensity of steel production in major producing countries.  As can be seen, 
                                                 
47 For example, a number of studies have measured the carbon content of U.S. produced goods 
relying on input-output accounts.  HASSETT, K. A., A. MATHUR, and G. E. METCALF (2009): "The 
Incidence of a U.S. Carbon Tax: A Lifetime and Regional Analysis," The Energy Journal, 30, 
157-179.  Comparable quality data that covers multiple years in an up to date fashion simply do 
not exist, for example, for China and other major exporting developing countries. 
48For example, this proposal has been suggested jointly by American Electric Power and the 
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (see description and discussion in COMMITTEE ON 
ENERGY AND COMMERCE (2008): "Climate Change Legislation Design White Paper: 
Competitiveness Concerns/Engaging Developing Countries," Washington, DC: U.S. House 
Committee on Energy and Commerce.) 
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there are dramatic differences.  The U.S. tax on steel would be significantly too 
low for imports of steel from Russia, for example.   
 
Similarly, U.S. carbon intensity for chemicals is different from the intensity in 
other countries and, in this case, often higher, producing too high a border tax.   
 On a related matter, a tax based on U.S. emissions would not create any 
incentive for foreign producers to substitute toward low-emission production 
techniques.  The tax would remain the same, so if a low emission production 
technique is otherwise less desirable, the tax will not induce the needed 
switching.49 
 An alternative system would be to base border tax adjustments on 
estimates of average emissions in the exporting nation from production of a given 
good.  This would require information about production techniques and energy 
                                                 
49 An additional problem might arise if emissions from production of a good vary widely in the 
U.S.  It would then be difficult to determine which production system to base the border tax on. 
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systems abroad at the national level but not the firm level.  While possibly more 
information intensive than basing the tax on the importing country’s emissions, it 
is potentially more accurate.  Thus, the border taxes for steel would reflect the 
national differences illustrated in the table above.  The main question will be the 
availability and reliability of national-level data for developing countries.  In 
addition, this approach runs directly into the legal problem with basing taxes on 
production techniques. 
Yet another refinement would be to allow individual exporting firms to 
provide information proving that they are below their national averages.  A 
particularly efficient firm, therefore, could get a lower border tax, creating an 
incentive to shift to more efficient technologies.    
Any border tax adjustment, whether based on importing country 
information, exporting country information, or firm-level information, will 
require significant information gathering, documentation, categorization, and 
recordkeeping.  Without border tax adjustments, a carbon tax could cover 80 
percent of U.S. emissions by taxing around 3,000 companies and could cover an 
even larger fraction without imposing a significant additional burden.  Once we 
have border tax adjustments, we would need records of carbon emissions from a 
wide variety of activities.  Dispute resolution mechanisms would be needed.  
Because technology changes all the time, disputes would continue.   
By way of analogy, consider how hard carbon footprint labeling has been.  
The problem for determining proper border tax adjustments is essentially the 
same.  The tax, which looked so simple, suddenly becomes a very difficult 
administrative exercise. 
E. Summary 
The above discussion leads us to the following conclusions.  Border tax 
adjustments may be necessary, but only for trade with countries without a carbon 
price.  Moreover, they are likely to be very complicated to administer and legally 
suspect.  Therefore, for trade within the set of countries with an adequate carbon 
price, an origin basis system, (one without border tax adjustments), is preferable.  
The major effect of this choice is to allocate carbon tax revenues to countries 
producing carbon-intensive goods instead of to countries consuming carbon 
intensive goods. 
For imports from countries without an adequate carbon price, we most 
likely would need to impose a border tax based on either of the two methods 
discussed above to prevent leakage.  Moreover, when combined with the origin-
basis system, it creates an incentive for these countries to impose a carbon price.  
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By imposing a carbon price, they would effectively get the revenue that the U.S. 
would otherwise receive because of the border tax.  Limiting border tax 
adjustments to the most carbon intensive goods and goods where the production is 
particularly mobile might help reduce the administrative cost (although it would 
increase the rent seeking costs as industries lobbied for border tax adjustments for 
their industry).    
A more difficult issue is whether to allow rebates for exports to these 
countries.  Not allowing rebates may significantly reduce the administrative 
complexity of the system.  The idea would be that we generally have an origin 
basis system and do not allow rebates.  We impose a border tax on import as only 
a substitute for the carbon price that was not imposed in the producing country, 
and this border tax on import does not warrant a corresponding rebate on export. 
Without rebates on export, however, there would be an incentive to shift 
production to countries without a carbon price to the extent that the goods are 
consumed there. there.  For example, suppose that a producer in the United States 
is exporting a carbon intensive good to a country without a carbon price.  If we do 
not give a rebate of the carbon tax on export, the producer could shift the 
production to the foreign country to avoid the tax.  A second problem is that there 
could be double taxes under certain circumstances: if raw materials subject to a 
carbon tax are exported to a non-carbon pricing country where they are made into 
final goods and imported into a country with a carbon price, there would be a risk 
of imposing the carbon tax twice.  Administering a system to prevent such double 
taxation would be complex.  Finally, a one-way system of taxes on import but not 
rebates on export, might be harder to justify under the WTO.  If these problems 
are severe, we could offer rebates for exports to countries without a carbon price.  
Like with imports, we could reduce administrative costs by limiting rebates to the 
most carbon-intensive goods.   
VI. Interaction with Existing Domestic Taxes and Regulations 
There are a large number of regimes in the U.S. that affect carbon 
emissions, from various command and control regulations to incentives and taxes.  
An important question in implementing a carbon tax is how it interacts with 
existing rules.  In this section, we offer a brief review of the relevant existing 
regimes and a discussion of whether and how they would need to be modified if 
the United States had a broad-based carbon tax. 
We have already noted that the U.S. imposes a gas tax.  We argued that 
this should remain in place if a carbon tax is enacted on the basis that the gas tax 
corrects for nonclimate change related externalities from driving. 
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The major form of support for renewable energy production in the United 
States is the system of production tax credits for renewable power enacted in the 
Energy Policy Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-486).  Production tax credits (PTCs) are 
provided for qualifying facilities (wind power, biomass, and geothermal among 
other sources) for ten years at a rate of 1.5¢ per kWh.50  PTCs have generally been 
viewed as successful except for the uncertainty surrounding their Congressional 
renewal every two years.  Congressional delays have twice led to their temporary 
expiration with a consequent fall in investment in the following year (see 
discussion in Wiser, R. (2007)).   
 The role of production tax credits is to reduce the price of renewably 
generated electricity relative to that of fossil or nuclear fueled electricity.  A 
carbon tax would also lower the price of non-fossil fuel generated electricity 
relative to fossil-fuel generated electricity by raising the cost of the latter rather 
than the PTC's subsidy to the former.  A tax based approach has two advantages 
over the PTC approach.  First, the carbon tax raises the cost of electricity on 
average while the PTC lowers it on average.  The tax then provides an additional 
mechanism to reduce carbon emissions by reducing overall demand for electricity 
rather than stimulating it as the subsidy does.   Second, the carbon tax creates a 
price differential among fossil fuels based on their carbon content.  Studies such 
as Metcalf, G. E., S. Palstev, J. Reilly, H. D. Jacoby and J. Holak (2008) show 
that an early response to carbon pricing is fuel substitution in the electric utility 
industry to shift away from coal towards natural gas.   These considerations all 
suggest that the appropriate policy would be to eliminate production tax credits if 
a carbon tax were enacted. 
 A second regulatory approach at the federal level is the mandating of 
minimum fuel efficiency standards through the Corporate Average Fuel 
Efficiency (CAFE) program.  CAFE mandates fleet standards for automobiles and 
light trucks.  CAFE standards were significantly tightened in the Energy 
Independence and Security Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-140) which will raise the fleet 
average from the current level of 26.7 mpg in 2007 to 35 mpg by 2020.51 
                                                 
50   METCALF, G. E. (2007): "Federal Tax Policy toward Energy," Tax Policy and the Economy, 21, 
145-184. describes federal energy tax policies in detail and provides a levelized cost analysis of 
the benefit of these subsidies.  CARLSON, C., and G. E. METCALF (2008): "Energy Tax Incentives 
and the Alternative Minimum Tax," National Tax Journal, 61, 477-491. discuss the interaction 
between energy credits and the corporate alternative minimum tax. 
51   Prior to the 2007 act, separate standards existed for automobiles and light trucks.  In 2007 the 
standards were 27.5 mpg and 22.2 mpg respectively with a realized fleet average of 26.7 mpg.  
See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION (2008): "Revised Summary of Fuel Economy 
Performance," Washington, DC: NHTSA. for fleet efficiency data and CAFE standards. 
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 Ellerman, A. D., H. D. Jacoby and M. B. Zimmerman (2006) consider 
how Corporate Average Fuel Efficiency (CAFE) standards could be integrated 
into a cap and trade system and estimate that the cost of carbon emission 
reductions through CAFE is in the neighborhood of $350 per ton of CO2 
equivalent, considerably higher than estimates of permit prices under the 
Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act (S. 2191) (see Appendix D to Paltsev, 
S., J. M. Reilly, H. D. Jacoby, A. C. Gurgel, G. E. Metcalf, A. P. Sokolov and J. 
F. Holak (2007)).  This estimate helps make two points.  First, sector-based 
regulatory policies that are not integrated more broadly into a carbon reduction 
scheme can be very expensive.  Second, the early reductions in carbon emissions 
are likely to occur in industry and the electric utility industry rather than in the 
transport sector.  Since the source of emissions has no bearing on damages 
associated with climate change, sector based approaches are likely to be quite 
inefficient.52   
At the sub-federal level, the number of state-level programs to control 
greenhouse gas emissions or to encourage renewable energy programs is growing.  
Thirty-two states have some form of renewable portfolio standard (RPS) 
mandating a given percentage of electricity be provided by renewable sources.  
DSIRE (2008)   
 RPS programs generally mandate that electricity distributors or retailers 
must provide Renewable Energy Credits (RECs) for a given percentage or amount 
of electricity sold by the facility.  A qualifying renewable facility is provided a 
number of RECs based on its electricity production that the facility may then sell 
in a REC market to distributors or retailers needing RECs to match their power 
sales.  The sale of RECs provides a subsidy to renewable electricity generation 
financed by utility customers and/or shareholders.   
 A slightly different approach to supporting renewable electricity 
generation is through a Feed-in Tariff.  A feed-in tariff requires utilities to 
purchase power from qualifying facilities at a fixed rate (or premium) for a given 
number of years.   Feed-in tariffs differ from renewable portfolio standards in 
setting a price for renewable electricity rather than a fixed amount of new 
supply.53  They differ from production tax credits in two important ways.  First 
                                                 
52   Other pollutants or market failures may provide a rationale for reducing oil consumption or 
tailpipe emissions.  This simply reflects the fact that multiple instruments are generally needed to 
address multiple market failures. 
53 In this sense the two instruments correspond to subsidy versions of price versus quantity 
controls. 
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they can be designed to provide a price guarantee rather than a fixed premium.54  
This has two benefits.  If the generation price of competing fossil fuel generators 
falls, the FIT subsidy rises to maintain a fixed purchase price.  This provides price 
stability to investors.  On the other hand, if competing generation prices rise, the 
FIT phases out and so reduces the cost to rate payers.  FITs differ from production 
tax credits in a second important way.  While PTCs are subsidized by the federal 
government and subject to reauthorization every two years, FITs are subsidized 
by rate payers.  This may reduce politically motivated price volatility as has 
occurred with PTCs in recent years. 
 RPS and FIT programs serve support renewable electricity generation.  
Unlike the production tax credits, they raise the average price of electricity 
thereby providing a demand side reduction in emissions.  Unlike a carbon tax, 
however, they are sectoral based policies and thus will not necessarily lead to the 
equalization of marginal abatement costs across different sources of carbon, a 
necessary condition for efficiency in carbon emission policy.  An important 
federalism policy arises with the adoption of a federal carbon tax.  Should the tax 
supplant these state-level policies or co-exist with them?  For the RPS program, a 
national carbon tax would reduce the value of RECs by the magnitude of the 
carbon tax.55  As we discussed above with respect to the transition to a carbon tax, 
governments should not engage in compensations for takings of this sort.  For the 
FIT program, the carbon tax would simply replace a portion (or all) of the FIT 
subsidy.  To see this, imagine that a natural gas power plant is the marginal fuel 
source and costs 6¢ per kWh.  A wind generator in contrast costs 9¢ per kWh.  
The feed in tarrif would be 3¢ per kWh for the wind facility funded by ratepayers 
of the utility purchasing the wind power.  Now consider a carbon tax that raises 
the cost of gas from 6¢ per kWh to 8.5¢ per kWh.  The FIT automatically drops to 
0.5¢ per kWh on the wind generated electricity.   
 A third regulatory regime of importance is the emerging carbon cap and 
trade programs at the state or regional level.  The two most significant to date are 
the Northeast states' Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) and California's 
                                                 
54  Feed in tariffs (FITs) have been constructed to provide a price premium or a fixed price.  
European FITs have generally been of the fixed price rather than premium type.  See METCALF, G. 
E. (2008): "Tax Policy Financing for Alternative Energy Equipment," Journal of Equipment Lease 
Financing, 26, 1-7. for a discussion of European FITs and RICKERSON, W., F. BENNHOLD, and J. 
BRADBURY (2008): "Feed-in Tariffs and Renewable Energy in the United States - a Policy 
Update," Washington DC: Heinrich Boll Foundation. for a discussion of their possible use in the 
United States.. 
55   If the RPS program were abolished upon enactment of a carbon tax, the value of RECs would 
go to zero. 
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Global Warming Solution Act of 2006 (AB 32) which establishes a statewide 
emissions cap in 2020 equal to 1990 levels.  While the California Air Resources 
Board (CARB), the agency tasked with implementing this law, has not yet 
determined what instruments it will use to meet this goal, it is widely expected 
that it will recommend a cap and trade system.  The RGGI initiative builds on 
state-level initiatives to cap emissions from the electric power sector in their state.  
RGGI establishes a regional trading system to reduce costs among participating 
states.  In the first phase, it caps emissions at "current levels," by 2009.  Current 
emissions are defined as 188 million short tons of CO2, roughly 4 percent above 
average regional emissions in 2000 to 2004.  It would then reduce emissions 
gradually to achieve a ten percent reduction from current levels by 2018.56 
 In addition to RGGI, the Midwestern Regional Greenhouse Gas Reduction 
Accord was established in November 2007 with six states and one Canadian 
province participating.  A separate Western Climate Initiative has recently set a 
goal of a fifteen percent reduction below 2005 levels by 2020.57 
 A similar issue arises with regional or state-level cap and trade programs 
as with RPS programs upon enactment of a carbon tax.  If a federal tax must be 
paid on emissions for which a state or regional permit is required, the value of the 
permit will fall by the amount of the tax (or to zero, whichever is less).  States 
might argue that the carbon tax should not apply to emissions subject to state or 
regional permits.  This would be equivalent to carbon tax revenues being levied 
on all emissions and rebated to holders of state or regional cap and trade permits.  
This would be a mistake.  
VII. Conclusion 
Most carbon pricing regimes are imposed on relatively narrow bases and 
are imposed midstream, on industrial users of energy.  Moreover, the trend seems 
to be in the direction of a cap and trade system.  We propose a different approach 
here.  For reasons long established in the literature, a carbon tax is preferable to a 
cap and trade system.  We show that a well-implemented carbon tax imposed 
upstream can easily cover 80 percent of U.S. emissions and can likely cover 
almost 90 percent with a modest additional cost.  The benefits of the broad base 
and lower compliance costs are likely to be significant.  
                                                 
56  See "Overview of RGGI CO2 Budget Trading Program" available at 
http://www.rggi.org/docs/program_summary_10_07.pdf, accessed on May 27, 2008. 
57   These regional initiatives are described at 
http://www.pewclimate.org/what_s_being_done/in_the_states/regional_initiatives.cfm, accessed 
on May 27, 2008. 
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